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INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand are two of the most renowned judges in American history.' And within this small frater* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. B.A. 1995, J.D. 2001, University of Michigan.
Many thanks to Paul Diller, Rob Morrill, Mark Quinlivan, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and
Marcela Sdnchez for providing helpful commentary. I am especially grateful to Richard
Friedman for his patient guidance of this project. All views expressed in this article
(and any errors) are my own.
1.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARaozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 9-10 (1990)

("Cardozo is generally placed in the highest rank of American judges, along with
Holmes, John Marshall, Brandeis, and Learned Hand."); Felix Frankfurter, Judge
Learned Hand, 60 HARv. L. REV. 325, 325 (1947) (also equating Hand with Holmes,
Brandeis, and Cardozo).
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nity, Cardozo and Hand are often referenced in tandem, and
deservedly so. 2 They were friends and contemporaries, almost concurrently establishing themselves as the shining stars of two of the
most important appellate courts in the country. 3 Indeed, the seminal biographies of both Cardozo 4 and Hand,5 recently published to
critical acclaim, 6 emphasize the prominence of each in relation to
the other. According to Cardozo biographer Andrew Kaufman,
"[a]t the opening of 1932, Cardozo was the preeminent judge in
the country who was not sitting on the Supreme Court. Only
Learned Hand, who was not so well known, was his equal in ability
and accomplishment." 7 Hand biographer Gerald Gunther echoes
this sentiment: "Learned Hand is numbered among a small group
of truly great judges of the twentieth century, a group that includes
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo."8 Beyond skill and reputation, however, Cardozo and Hand
may have more in common than previously known. More specifically, the thorough tomes of Professors Kaufman and Gunther unwittingly raise the possibility that Hand's nomination to the
Southern District of New York in 1909 came only after Cardozo first
declined an offer for the same seat.
In 1909, Cardozo and Hand were both private practitioners,
yet to ascend to the bench. Neither Kaufman nor Gunther directly
links the beginning of Cardozo and Hand's respective judicial careers, but Kaufman does include the following anecdote:
2.
See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Foreword: Homage to Mr.Justice Cardozo, 1 CARDOzo L.
REv. 1, 1 (1979) (stating Hand "might have been thought Cardozo's only peer for the
mantle of Holmes").
3. Cardozo sat on the New York Court of Appeals from 1914-1932; Hand on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1924-1961. It was on these
two courts that the work of both men is most celebrated, but each did have additional
judicial experience. Cardozo also served on the New York Supreme Court from January
to February 1914 and the United States Supreme Court from 1932 to 1938. Hand was a
judge on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York from
1909 to 1924.
4. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
5. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
6. See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, A Modern Hamlet in the Judicial Pantheon, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1841 (1995) (book review); Judith S. Kaye, Cardozo: A Law Classic, 112
HARv. L. REv. 1026 (1999) (book review).
7. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 455.
8. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at xv.
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In 1908 or 1909, United States Attorney General George

Wickersham had Charles C. Burlingham ask Cardozo if
he would accept a judgeship on the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Cardozo refused, saying that he had two sisters to support and that
the salary of $6,000 was too low. 9
As Gunther recounts in great detail, there was at this time only one
vacancy on the Southern District of New York, and the position ultimately was filled by Hand.' 0 It thus appears, at least at first glance,
that Hand was the direct beneficiary of Cardozo's refusal, but
neither Kaufman nor Gunther highlights the connection. The discrepancy is puzzling, and defies a simple explanation. Most significantly, Kaufman's primary source for this passage is the offeror
himself, Burlingham, a New York City powerbroker who was in his
nineties at the time he was recalling events that allegedly occurred
nearly a half century earlier."' Burlingham's account is somewhat
bolstered by Hand's telling Kaufman that he too had approached
Cardozo about ajudgeship on the Southern District, 12 but this additional evidence raises more questions than it answers. Why did Burlingham remain silent for so long about such a fascinating historical
footnote? And how did Hand never surmise, or at least never publicly comment upon, this shared circumstance with his friend and
fellow jurist?
The most obvious sources for resolving these incongruities are
Kaufman and Gunther. But at no point in their books did either
author perform such an inquiry. In fact, in this context Kaufman
does not even mention Hand's subsequent nomination, and Gunther does not list Cardozo among Hand's potential rivals. When
contacted and asked why, neither author can fully answer this intriguing question. Stated Kaufman, "I must confess that my major
interest in the story was Cardozo's reputation at that time in his
career and his acquaintance with Burlingham, and so I never pursued the issue." 13 Gunther likewise explained, "I have seen no evi9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Fairchild

KAUFMAN,

supra note 4, at 100-01.

See infra text accompanying § II.A.
See infra text accompanying § III.A.3.
See infra text accompanying § W.A.
See Letter from Andrew Kaufman, Cardozo Biographer, Charles Stebbins
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to Stephen Hessler (Jan. 27,
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dence that Hand was the second choice after Cardozo," and
therefore "cannot shed further light on [this] puzzle."1 4 The formidable biographies written by Kaufman and Gunther, each highly
anticipated and decades in the making, reflect our sustained interest in Cardozo and Hand. 15 In addition to these book length treatments of each man's life, there also have been articles addressing
Cardozo's nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 193216 and
Hand's near-nomination to that same bench in 1930.1 7 Granted,
appointments to the Southern District of New York do not generate
the same attention as do those to the nation's highest court, but to
the extent we are interested for myriad reasons in the circumstances of both men at the apex of their judicial careers, so too
should we be intrigued by, and seek to clarify, the events at the
beginning.' 8 This seems especially true when facts have emerged
2000) (This letter, as well as all other letters referenced in this article, are on file with
the author).
14. See Letter from Gerald Gunther, Hand Biographer, Professor of Law Emeritus,
Stanford Law School, to Stephen Hessler (Jan. 26, 2000).
15. See Richard D. Friedman, Cardozo the [Small r] realist, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1738,
1740 (2000) (book review) ("In the time that Kaufman worked on this book [19571998], others completed projects of less imposing scope on Cardozo. But no future
scholar will be able to duplicate Kaufman's work, even if one were so inclined ...
[T] his will be the standard Cardozo biography, not only for our time but presumably
for all time.); Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question ofJudicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 512 (1994) (book review) (noting that Gunther worked on
his project for thirty-seven years, and therefore "[t] he Hand biography has been long
awaited in the figurative sense . . . and in the literal as well.").
16.
See Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo's Appointment to the Supreme Court, 1 CARDozo
L. REv. 23 (1979).
17. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Justice Hughes' Appointment - The Cotton Story ReExamined, YEARBOOK 1981, SUPREME COURT HisToRIcAL SOCIETY. For many years there

circulated a disputed story involving the replacement of Chief Justice William Taft in
1930. Joseph Cotton was at that time an undersecretary in the State Department and
close confidante of President Herbert Hoover. Cotton claims that he recommended to
Hoover that Associate Justice Harlan Fiske Stone be elevated to ChiefJustice and Hand
be nominated for Stone's seat. Hoover allegedly agreed, but felt he needed to first
offer the ChiefJusticeship to former Associate Justice Charles Evans Hughes, fully confident that Hughes would decline. Alas, Hughes accepted, thus foreclosing another opportunity for Hand to ascend to the Supreme Court. See id; see also GUNTHER, supra note
5, at 418-28.
18. Professor Richard Friedman discussed briefly the story of the 1909 nomination
in a recent Michigan Law Review piece reviewing Kaufman's Cardozo. See Friedman,
supra note 15, at 1747 n.41. But Friedman surmised that any offer to Cardozo to join
the Southern District must have been for a different seat than the one received by
Hand. I was Friedman's research assistant at the time, and brought this issue to his
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that indicate Hand's ascent to the federal bench (and eventual
greatness) came about only after Cardozo first rejected the very
same opportunity.
The easiest possible explanation is that no offer ever was made
to Cardozo. I believe this hypothesis must be inaccurate. First,
there is no logical reason for Burlingham, one of the most prominent figures in New York City politics for over fifty years, 19 to concoct this tale from his imagination. No one questions his integral
20
role in launching the judicial careers of both Cardozo and Hand,
and spinning this particular yarn would do little to aggrandize his
already formidable reputation. And if Burlingham had little motivation to lie, Kaufman had even less inclination to disbelieve him.
The Harvard professor undertook this project in 1957 at the urging
of Justice Felix Frankfurter, for whom he was then clerking, and
21
spent the next forty years meticulously researching Cardozo's life.
It is highly unlikely that Kaufman would credit Burlingham's narrative if he harbored even the slightest doubt about its overall veracity. Ascribing ulterior motive or bad faith to either man is
unwarranted.
But accepting that Cardozo was legitimately asked to join the
Southern District does not necessarily mean that the quite elderly
Burlingham was correct in remembering that the offer was made in
1908 or 1909. Cardozo would remain in private practice until the
close of the Taft administration in early 1913. One may thus speculate that Cardozo was approached about a different judgeship on
the same court at some point in the interim. As coincidence would
have it, the death of one of the Southern District's members created a vacancy on that bench in late 1911, and the fact that the
opening was filled in early 1912 lends credence to the argument
that this was the seat for which Wickersham had Burlingham approach Cardozo. What do Kaufman and Gunther think? Kaufman
is willing to concede "it is not impossible" that Cardozo was offered
the seat that went to Hand, but he also equivocates that "maybe it
attention. This Article is the result of my efforts to determine whether Friedman's initial conclusions were correct.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 31 to 39.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 40, 89, 144.
21. See KAuImAN, supra note 4, at ix; Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo and the Art of
Biography, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1246 (1999).
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was 1911 or 1912 when [Burlingham] approached Cardozo." 2 2
Gunther, while far from certain, "suspect[s] the explanation that
23
the offer was made in 1911 or 1912 is the most persuasive one."
After extensive research into this question, I believe it is not
only plausible, but actually probable that Cardozo did decline the
very judgeship Hand received in 1909. My thesis, to be sure, is susceptible to challenge. Stated briefly, it is inexplicable that this story
has never been told, and in light of the subsequent opening on the
Southern District, it is tempting to assume that decades later Burlingham's aged faculties failed him as to the relatively minor detail
of the precise date of the offer. This assumption, however, is persuasive only when made in the abstract. When examined in a
broader historical-political context, one may clearly discern that the
1909 and 1912 nominations involved vastly dissimilar implications.
This Article will demonstrate that the reasons Cardozo would have
been attractive to the Taft administration in 1909 were no longer
salient by 1912. Part II establishes the relevant chronological and
factual perspective of the events in question. Part III then examines
the possible explanations for when the offer was made to Cardozo,
and considers the persuasiveness of each. Part IV endeavors to answer two unresolved questions; namely, was Hand at some point the
bearer of a second offer to Cardozo, and how does one account for
the fact that none of the principals involved were more forthcoming with the full details of this story? In conclusion, I summarize my
theory that the origins of the judicial careers of two of our most
celebrated legal icons were intertwined to an extraordinary extent
previously unrecognized.
II.

THREE JUDGES TAKE THE BENCH

Before muddying the waters with speculation as to what might
have happened nearly a century ago, it is helpful at the outset to
establish those points that are incontrovertible. This Part defines
the parameters of the time period within which any offer to Cardozo must have been tendered by examining the factual record of
three judicial nominations that occurred in New York over the
course of approximately four and a half years. In so doing, one
22.
23.

Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13.
Letter from Gunther to Hessler, supra note 14.
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hypothesis can be proven with certainty: any offer to Cardozo must
have come between November 1908 and March 1913.
A.

Learned Hand

Learned Hand began seeking a federal judgeship in 1907, the
next step in the career of an intellectually curious young lawyer who
had suffered a decade of frustration in private practice. 24 Born and
raised in Albany, New York, Billings Learned Hand - he abandoned
the first of his ostentatious three names in his twenties 25 - graduated from Harvard College in 1893 and Harvard Law School in
1896.26 Family considerations and a lack of confidence in his legal
abilities, despite his excellent law school record, prompted Hand to
eschew the prestigious firms of New York City and return to Albany. 27 But after only six years, chafing at the limited professional
and intellectual opportunities in his hometown, Hand moved to
New York City. 28 The change of environs led only partially to a
change of fortunes. Hand still enjoyed meager success as an attorney, but he thrived among the intellectually elite and politically
powerful members of the bar engaged in New York civic reform
movements.

29

It was during this time that Hand met Charles Culp Burlingham. Of the many influential figures with whom Hand would forge
friendships, none would prove more valuable, or more lasting, than
that with "C.C.B." 30 Burlingham, the "Nestor of the New York
Bar, ''31 enjoyed what surely is one of the more extraordinary lives
never chronicled in a full-length biography. He began practicing
law in 1881, joined Wing, Shoudy and Putnam in 1883, and re24.

See

GuNTHER,

supra note 5, at 123-27.

25.
See id. at 5. Hand felt his was "a vastly formidable name which you can only
use when you bury a man or send him to jail." Whitney North Seymour, Tribute to the
"Old Chief" of the Bench, reprinted in 264 F.2d 5, 31 (1959), as part of a ceremony commemorating Hand's fifty years as a federal judge.

26.
27.
though
sixth in
28.
29.
30.
31.

See

GuNTHER,

supra note 5, at 26-53.

See id. at 53-54. Hand was elected an editor of the Harvard Law Review, (altime pressures and boredom led him to resign within a year), and graduated
his class. See id. at 44-45.
See id. at 53-71.
See id. at 101-15.
See id. at 107-08.
Wright, supra note 6, at 1843.
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mained a member of the firm for the next eight decades, until his
death in 1959 two months shy of his 101st birthday.8 2 Professional
distinction came as a leader of the admiralty bar; Burlingham in
1891 argued the first case heard by the newly created Second Circuit,8 3 and later appeared many times before the U.S. Supreme
Court.3 4 Burlingham's political resume was no less impressive. He

was a "leading figure in New York reform movements for over half a
century" whose "informal influence . . .was phenomenal." 35 He

held only two public offices in his very long life, serving as a member of the New York City Board of Education from 1897 to 1902
and as president of that body from 1902 to 1903. But Burlingham's
relentless opposition to machine politics allowed him to transcend
partisanship and provide counsel to successions of city, state, and
federal administrations, regardless of party affiliation.3 6 And on
one topic more so than any other did Burlingham dispense advice:
judicial nominations.3 7 In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "[o]ne
may say with assurance that no lawyer labored as persistently, as
shrewdly and as successfully in getting good men on the courts in
New York, both city and state, and on the federal bench throughout
the country, as did C.C.B." 38 Burlingham more modestly described
his contributions, remarking towards the end of his life, "I have
been deeply interested in getting better judges."3 9 For present purposes, the result of one of his efforts is clear, "Burlingham deserved,
claimed, and received much of the credit for Hand's
40
nomination.
But while Burlingham would champion Hand's appointment,
elevation to the bench did not come immediately. In March 1907,
32.

See DIcTlIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 87 (Supp. 6 1980); see also Felix Frank-

furter, A Legal Triptych, 74 HARv. L. REv. 433, 434-35 (1961). By 1953, the firm had
been renamed Burlingham, Hupper and Kennedy. See id.
33. See The Sarah Cullen, 49 F. 166 (2d Cir. 1891).
34. See Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 435 (listing cases).
35. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 608 n.22; GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 108.
36.

See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRApHYi, supra note 32, at 87-88.

37. See Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 436 ("The cause nearest to [Burlingham's]
heart, to which he gave effective devotion throughout his life, was an independent and
qualified judiciary.").
38. Id.
39.
The Reminisces of Charles Culp Burlingham, Columbia Oral History Project 40
(1961) [hereinafter Burlingham COHP].
40.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 130.
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Hand's father-in-law, Frederick Fincke, a lawyer in Utica, mentioned the impending retirement of a federal judge from New York,
and "added cryptically that it might be nice if someone in the family
filled the vacancy." 41 Hand responded that he was interested, to
which Fincke replied that the position was "a U.S. Circuit, not District, Court judgeship," and "I had myself in mind, not you, when I
spoke of [the] vacant place. '42 Fincke nevertheless insisted that he
"would not take the place if offered to me on a gold platter," but
Learned, languishing in practice, fairly leapt at the potential opportunity. 43 After dissuading his father-in-law's concerns that a federal

judge could not provide for his family financially, 44 Hand set about
lining up support for his candidacy. He undoubtedly sought Burlingham's assistance, but C.C.B's endorsement went to Henry G.
Ward, who was appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt to the
45
Second Circuit on May 18, 1907.

41.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 124.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Salary concerns would influence appreciably the judicial aspirations of both
Cardozo and Hand. Kaufman writes Cardozo turned down an offer for a seat on the
Southern District in 1908 or 1909 because the $6,000 salary was too low. See supra text
accompanying note 9. Kaufman also notes that $6,000 was at this time equal to approximately $100,000 in mid-1990's dollars. While not an insignificant sum of money, "Cardozo was supporting an expensive household." KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 101. When
the opportunities for election to the New York Supreme Court and appointment to the
New York Court of Appeals came about five years later, the respective salaries of those
positions, $17,500 and $13,700 ($290,000 and $228,000 in mid-1990's dollars), were
enough to allay Cardozo's concerns. See id. at 127.
Hand's income at the time, however, included a $9,000 annual inheritance from
an uncle in addition to the $6,000 he would earn as ajudge. While Hand's father-in-law
did not consider a man who made $15,000 a year to be "independently wealthy," this
was, asJudge Posner points out, equivalent to over $225,000 in 1991 dollars. See Posner,
supra note 15, at 533. Thus, while Cardozo felt he could not afford to become a federal
judge in 1909, Hand apparently was able to make ends meet.
45. See 152 F. iii (1907). It is unclear that Burlingham specifically preferred Ward
to Hand, but Frankfurter assigns responsibility for Ward's appointment to Burlingham,
and C.C.B. takes credit as well. See Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 436; Burlingham
COHP, supra note 39, at 41. One obvious reason may have been that in 1907 Ward had
been practicing for twenty-five years, whereas Hand had been doing so for slightly more
than ten. See the biography of Ward in the Federal Judges Biographical Database, at
http://air.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/fc_bio. Ironically, although Burlingham advocated Ward for the Second Circuit in 1907 and Hand for the Southern District in 1909,
C.C.B. later came to believe that Ward "would have made a good DistrictJudge but he
was not so satisfactory as an Appellate Judge," while Hand on the Second Circuit "came
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So Hand would have to wait his turn, but not for long. An
immediate hurdle was that the Southern District, the likely destination for the thirty-five year old Hand, had no vacancy. The court
that would later evolve into one of the nation's most active jurisdictions was at this time a relatively small operation. The most recent
addition to the bench, Charles M. Hough, had been appointed in
June 1906 (also upon Burlingham's recommendation 4 6 ) to a third
47
seat Congress had recently authorized for the Southern District.
But later that same year a Judiciary Committee report in the U.S.
House of Representatives fostered the expectation that a fourth seat
was imminent. 48 In November 1908, William Howard Taft was
elected president, succeeding Roosevelt. While Taft was selecting
his cabinet, on January 20, 1909, H.R. 19655, a bill to add an additional seat on the Southern District, was reported out of the House
Judiciary Committee. 4 9 The legislation passed the House on February 16, 1909, was approved by the Senate within a week, and was
signed by Roosevelt on March 2nd, only two days before his term
50
expired.
On March 5, 1909, the Senate confirmed George W. Wickersham as Attorney General. 5 1 Wickersham was a highly respected
Wall Street attorney, law partner of Henry Taft, the President's
brother and close adviser, and, like so many influential members of
the New York bar, close friends with Burlingham. 5 2 Although both
President Taft and Wickersham were staunch Republicans, they
into his own and he is now recognized as one of the greatest Judges in the country."
Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 41.
46.
See Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 40 ("I suppose I brought about the

nomination of Charles M. Hough."); Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 436.
47. See 145 F. iii (1906).
48. See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 128.
49. See 43 CONG. Rac., pt. 2, 1195 (1909).
50. See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 128-29.
51.
See 44 CONG. REC., pt. 1, 6-7 (1909).
52.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 129-30. Burlingham first became acquainted
with Wickersham when the latter joined the New York firm Strong & Cadwalader in the
early 1880s. (After the later addition of Henry Taft, the firm was eventually renamed
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft.) Burlingham described Wickersham as "an intimate
friend of mine" and "a very able man and a very fine character who knew the Bar and
the Bench very well." Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 9, 21-22. The two men
would still be collaborating in 1936, when Burlingham succeeded Wickersham as senior
warden of St. George's Episcopal Church. See Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 438. See
generally DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 713-15 (Supp. 2 1958).
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were also accomplished lawyers with a sincere respect for a qualified and independent judiciary. In 1909, as they set about the task
of filling the new seat on the Southern District - only the third
appointment of the young administration - Taft and Wickersham
publicly were committed to the ideal of merit-based appointments.

53

This was good news for Hand who, although a registered

Republican, "hardly qualified . . . as an active party man." 54 "His
candidacy would turn, as it had before, on his reputation as an
independent intellectual," and "[a]s soon as Wickersham made
clear that he was looking for quality candidates, Hand supporters especially the bar leaders whom Wickersham respected - conveyed
55
their recommendations."
Remember that Kaufman writes Wickersham had Burlingham
approach Cardozo about a judgeship on the Southern District in
1908 or 1909.56 Reasonable conjecture, as well as the details of

Hand's eventual nomination, can narrow this twenty-four month
window considerably. First, it is inconceivable that prior to the
presidential election on November 3, 1908, Wickersham, at this
time still an attorney in private practice, would have even thought
about - much less commissioned Burlingham to actually query Cardozo about - a judgeship that did not yet exist. Second, by April 1,
1909, Hand was already informing family members that Wickersham was urging Taft to send his nomination to the Senate. 5 7 One
may therefore realistically presume that if any offer to Cardozo was
made in 1908 or 1909, it must have come between November 1908
and March 1909.
In any event, by April 1909 it was clear Hand would be the
nominee. As Gunther explains, Hand's confirmation was not an
entirely smooth process. The independent Attorney General had
neglected to consult the GOP establishment prior to submitting
Hand's name. The senior senator from New York, Chauncey Depew, a fellow Republican and current member of the Judiciary
Committee, was displeased at having been bypassed. In a fit of pique, Depew declined to move Hand's nomination forward, and sen53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See infra § III.A.I.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 129.
Id. at 129, 130.
See supra text accompanying note 9.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 130.
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atorial courtesy stalled the appointment.

Wickersham finally

telephoned Depew, and "with barely curbed impatience .

.

. per-

suaded him that Hand's nomination was not the occasion for obstructionism." 58 Depew capitulated, and Hand soon received a
favorable vote from the Judiciary Committee. He was confirmed by
the full Senate on April 26, 1909, and took his judicial oath four
59
days later.
B. Julius Mayer
When appointed, Hand joined three colleagues on the Southern District: George B. Adams, George C. Holt, and Charles M.
Hough. 60 Within two years, Adams fell ill, and died on October 9,
1911.61 He was replaced by Julius Marshuetz Mayer, a "politically

well connected Republican" from New York City who enjoyed the
solid support of the local party establishment. 62 Mayer had established himself within the GOP ranks, but his backers were not
blindly partisan, as he was amply qualified for the post. After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1886, Mayer spent the first ten
years of his career in private practice. His involvement in Republican politics led to his appointment as counsel to the New York State
Excise Board in 1895 and the New York City Building Department
in 1897.63 Mayer was named a Justice of the New York Court of
Special Sessions in 1902 by the reformist Mayor Seth Low, but only
upon the recommendation of the notorious machine boss Thomas
Collier Platt.64 Mayer resigned after only two years to seek elective
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 132-33.
59.
See id. at 133.
60.
See 168 F. iii (1909).
61.
See 190 F. v (1911).
62.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 144. See also infra text accompanying notes 183
to 196.
63.
See the biography of Mayer in the Federal Judges Biographical Database, available at http://air.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/fjc_bio.
64. See THOMAS COLLIER PLATT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS COLLIER PLATT
(1910). According to Platt, Low "finally agreed to appoint [Mayer] if I would make a
personal request. I did so, and Mayer went upon the bench." Mayer's selection would
be Low's sole concession to Platt. "Looking back over the personnel of the Low administration, I can hardly recall another official whose appointment was due ultimately to
my personal desire." Id. at 417. Whatever the impetus for his selection, the independent Low would later praise Mayer as "[bearing] the fine reputation of being both ajust
and a kind Judge." Letter from Seth Low to President William H. Taft (Dec. 22, 1911).
58.
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office, successfully running on the 1904 Republican ticket for New
65
York Attorney General.
General Mayer's tenure would be short but eventful. Less than
two months into his term he unsuccessfully defended before the
U.S. Supreme Court the maximum hour provisions of New York's
Bakeshop Act, and Joseph Lochner's misdemeanor conviction
thereunder. 66 Thus Mayer was involved in one of the most infamous constitutional law opinions ever issued, although the decision
attracted scant public attention when released. 6 7 Of much greater
interest to New York voters was Mayer's controversial role in the
extraordinary and protracted litigation prompted by the narrow defeat of William Randolph Hearst for New York City mayor in the fall
of 1905. The multimillionaire publisher and purveyor of "yellow
journalism" had been elected to Congress in 1902, defeated in his
bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1904, and was
determined to run for governor of New York in 1906.68 But in the

interim, the Municipal Ownership League persuaded Hearst to
mount a last-minute third-party challenge to the incumbent New
York City Mayor George McClellan, a Democrat backed by Tammany Hall, and his Republican opponent, William Ivins. Hearst's
candidacy was initially dismissed, but his anti-corruption message,
fueled by his profligate spending and extensive coverage within his
own newspapers, resonated with the electorate. Panic set in among
the major parties, and McClellan barely won by a plurality of only
65.
See Complete List of the Previous New York State Attorneys General, available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/previous-aglist.html. Mayer defeated John Cunneen, a
candidate of the Democrat and Prohibition parties, when "the Prohibitionists' vote did
not suffice to save the Erie leader, as it did in 1902." Roosevelt Comes Near to Breaking
Record, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1904, at 5.
66. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 50 (1905).
67. See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITIcs: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 128 (1990). One individual who did not fail to grasp the implications
of Lochner was Hand, who in 1908, while still in private practice, disparaged the opinion
in the pages of the Harvard Law Review. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the
Eight-HourDay,21 HARV. L. REv. 495 (1908). "Hand's strong criticism of the ruling and
the kind ofjudicial behavior it represented was one of the first published attacks on the
decision, and one of the most trenchant." The "essay elicited considerable attention
and helped to make him attractive to those eager to place more articulate and independent individuals on the bench." GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 118, 123.
68.
See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIoGcRAPHY 283-88 (Supp. 5 1977); W.A.
SWANBERG, CITIZEN HEARST: A BiocRAPHY OF WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST 230 (1961).
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3,472 votes out of more than 600,000 cast. Hearst alleged rampant
69
fraud by the Tammany forces, and demanded a recount.
Hearst initially took his challenge to the judiciary, but the New
York Court of Appeals reversed a writ of mandamus issued by the
New York Supreme Court ordering a recount. 70 He next mounted
an unsuccessful effort to persuade the state legislature to pass a bill
retroactively authorizing a recount. 7 1 Hearst's final avenue of recourse was to petition the Attorney General to institute quo warranto
proceedings; i.e., a suit filed on behalf of the voters to try McClellan's title to the office. 72 In April 1906, Mayer held a hearing and
73
received Hearst's proofs, but on July 16th denied the application.
The New York Times, no friend of Hearst or his rival publications,
editorialized that "[i]t is difficult to see how [Hearst] could be
treated with more fairness, indulgence, and consideration than was
shown by Attorney General Mayer," 74 but Mayer was vilified in
Hearst's papers. 75 Four months later Mayer was himself narrowly
defeated for reelection by Democrat William Jackson, 76 who had
run on the same ticket as Hearst for governor (who lost to Charles
Evans Hughes), all the while Hearst still clamoring for a recount in
the previous fall's mayoral campaign. 77 Jackson promptly filed the
quo warranto suit, but Mayer was later vindicated; after almost three
69.

See SWANBERG, supra note 68, at 230-38; THE GENTLEMAN AND THE TIGER: THE
221-27 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1956).

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, JR.

70.
See In re Hearst, 76 N.E. 28 (N.Y. 1905).
71.
See In re Hearst, 102 N.Y.S. 47, 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907).
72. A quo warranto action was a "common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise is claimed." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
1264 (7th ed. 1999).
73.
See People v. McClellan, 103 N.Y.S. 146, 146-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907).
74. Mr. Hearst's Application, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 17, 1906, at 6. Mayer had found that
Hearst's affidavits called into question less than 700 votes, an insufficient number to
overcome McClellan's margin of victory. See id.
75.
See Letter from Roger Foster to President William H. Taft (Jan. 13, 1912) (stating Mayer's decision "was the subject of attacks made upon him by the Hearst newspapers."). Cf also SWANBERG, supra note 68, at 239 ("[Hearst's] newspapers, insisting that
he won, called Boss Murphy a criminal, pictured him in stripes, and so insistently referred to McClellan as 'the fraud mayor' and 'the office thief' that he was strongly
tempted to sue for libel.").
76. Jackson beat Mayer 52-48%. See Vote by Counties: Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1906, at 2.
77. See Democrats Go In With Hughes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1906, at 2 ("In view of the
fact that an official count is likely to declare Mr. Jackson elected in place of Julius M.
Mayer, speculation naturally arises as to what he will do should Mr. Hearst pursue his
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years and multiple court battles McClellan again was declared the
winner following a judicial recount of all ballots cast. 78
Once out of office, Mayer returned to private practice for almost five years, butJudge Adams's death in October 1911 impelled
Mayer's political allies to advocate his appointment to the vacant
seat on the Southern District. 79 Mayer's candidacy would not be
without opposition, however. Twice in early 1912, after Mayer publicly had been mentioned for the judgeship, the New York Times carried vehement protests by the prominent reformer Florence Kelley,
General Secretary of the National Consumers' League. OnJanuary
23rd, the Times reported that Kelley launched a "bitter attack" in a
speech before the New York State Suffrage Association, assailing
Mayer's record as Attorney General, and decrying specifically his
failure to advance the interests of women and children laborers.8 0
Four days later, the Times covered Kelley's speech to a child labor
conference in which she claimed "[i] t will be a scandal and an outrage" if "this advocate of anarchy" is honored with an appointment
to the federal bench. 8 1 Hyperbole aside, Kelley's criticisms could
not be ignored blithely. She was, according to Felix Frankfurter,
the "woman who had probably the largest single share in shaping
the social history of the United States during the first thirty years of
this century."8 2 Still, Mayer was not himself without influence, and
within days his supporters had written Taft and Wickersham, rebutexpressed determination of opening the ballot boxes used in the last election for Mayor
and trying to oust Mr. McClellan.").
78. See A Bad Precedent, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 1908, at 6; MCCLELLAN, supra note 69, at
229.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 183 to 196.
80. Sufftagists Oppose Mayer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1912, at 3. Kelley alleged that
"because of the action of Mr. Mayer there is now a law by which women can be compelled to work at night; that it was because of a decision rendered by Mayer that the
children in the canneries are deprived of the protection of the law, and that he is responsible also for the 'present useless form of the newsboy law.'" Id.
81. Mrs. Kelley Assails Mayer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1912, at 8. Kelley reiterated her
earlier criticisms, and also accused Mayer of using his influence as the head of a charity
for Jewish children to unfairly lobby against child welfare bills. " [ W] henever we appear
before a committee of the Legislature asking if we may have a favorable law we are
always told that this great authority advocates leaving things as they are." Id.
82.

JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK,

IMPATIENT CRUSADER:

(1953) (Introduction byJustice Felix Frankfurter).
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ting each of Kelley's many charges.8 3 Apparently satisfied, Taft
nominated Mayer on February 19, 1912, and he was confirmed by
84
the Senate one week later.

Besides Hand, Mayer would be the only other appointment
Taft would make to the Southern District during his four years in
office. (The next vacancy would not arise until 1914 when Judge
Holt resigned, and President Woodrow Wilson named as his replacement none other than Augustus N. Hand,8 5 Learned's cousin,
again at the urging of Burlingham. 86 ) Thus one may posit, al-

though I will argue otherwise, that Wickersham had Burlingham
approach Cardozo in late 1911 or early 1912 about the opening
resulting from Adams's death, and that only after Cardozo declined
did the nomination go to Mayer.
C. Benjamin Cardozo
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo's public rise to judicial prominence
began in 1913. Unlike Hand, he had flourished in private practice,
and was one of the premier appellate lawyers in New York. 87 Unlike
83. See Letter from Leopold Plant to President William H. Taft (Jan. 26, 1912)
(noting that, as head of the Jewish Protectory and Aid Society, Mayer "has a consistent
record of helpfulness in matters relating to children and has drafted and aided in the
passage of a number of beneficent laws"); Letter from Robert W. de Forest to President
William H. Taft (Jan. 26, 1912) ("I think I can speak for all the sane and intelligent
philanthropic forces with which I am working in New York in saying that we regard Mr.
Mayer as a sympathetic, valuable and efficient ally"); Letter from Chas. T. White to
President William H. Taft (Jan. 27, 1912) (attesting to Mayer's honesty, capabilities, and
devotion to public duty: "Doubtless Mrs. Kelly [sic] is under a misapprehension."); Letter from P. Tecumseh Sherman to Attorney General George W. Wickersham (Jan. 30,
1912) ("This present attack comes with particularly bad grace because Mr. Mayer during his career has been unusually active in charities and especially in matters affecting
the welfare of children. He was an efficient Attorney General, and by active assistance
and advice most effectively aided the Department of Labor in enforcing the laws relative to labor of women and children."); Letter from William McAdoo to President William H. Taft Uan. 31, 1912) (stating Mayer is "a man of humane sentiments, charitable
and kindly disposed, especially towards those who are poor and weak and need the
protection of the law").
84. See the biography of Mayer in the Federal Judges Biographical Database, available at http://air.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/fjcbio.
85.
Holt resigned on January 15, 1914, see 208 F. xxv (1914), and Gus Hand took
this seat on September 30th of that year, see 215 F. vii (1914).
86. See Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 436.
87. "Virtually no one in the state appeared in the Court of Appeals more than
Cardozo, not even the Albany lawyers who were often retained just because they were in
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Mayer, he had no access to patronage; although a nominal Democrat, Cardozo was a political novice.8 8 Enter Burlingham, his benefactor as well.8 9 The machinations behind Cardozo's nomination
and election to the New York Supreme Court in 1913 may have
been more elaborate than Hand's relatively simple ascension to the
federal bench, but one factor remains constant: the presence of
Burlingham moving the political levers.
The 1913 campaign in New York featured a resuscitation of the
so-called "Fusion" movement - in which "good government" types
from within the Democrat, Republican, and Progressive parties
would join forces in a united challenge to Tammany Hall - that had
elected Seth Low mayor in 1901 (and would again succeed with
Fiorella LaGuardia in the 1930s).90 The coalition-building process
was premised on the understanding that the party of the mayoral
nominee received fewer of the lower positions on the ticket. A
committee of Fusion leaders, Burlingham among them, agreed
upon Democrat John Purroy Mitchel for mayor, leaving another
subcommittee, of which Burlingham was chairman, to select judicial nominees. Two seats on the New York Supreme Court, the primary trial court in the state, were up that fall, and both incumbents
sought reelection. Fusion opted to support only one, Democrat Eugene Philbin, and nominate a Jewish attorney for the other judgeship so as to bring religious balance to the ticket. Burlingham's
subcommittee solicited recommendations, and initially decided to
supportJuliusJ. Frank. They discarded their choice of Frank, however, after Burlingham met with Henry Moskowitz, a leader in local
civic and religious affairs. 91 Moskowitz told Burlingham: "You haven't got the right kind of Jew. Frank is a Felix Adler Jew, a Modernist. The man you want to get is a realJew. I'll tell you the man,
Cardozo. He is [in] the Portuguese Synagogue." 92 Burlingham followed Moskowitz's advice, and met with Cardozo to make the offer.
Albany." Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13. See also KAUFMAN,, supra note
4, at 93-113.
88. See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 101, 119, 157.
89. See id. at 608 n.22 ("Many prominent persons, including Cardozo, owed their
positions, at least in part, to his support.").
90.
See id. at 117; GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 107-08.
91.
See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 117-19.
92. Id. at 119.
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The opportunity to join the New York Supreme Court was particularly satisfying for Cardozo. In 1872, when Ben was two years
old, his father Albert had departed in disgrace from the very same
bench. The elder Cardozo was a product of Tammany Hall, and his
four years on the Supreme Court were marked by partisan rulings,
financial improprieties, and ethical lapses. He resigned in the face
of certain impeachment by the state Assembly and conviction by the
Senate. 93 Albert Cardozo died when Ben was only fifteen, too soon
to witness his son's spectacular academic careers and Columbia College and Law School. 9 4 There has been widespread speculation
about the effect of the sins of the father on the son; Kaufman believes it led Cardozo to become a lawyer and excel in that profession, 95 others are less convinced. 96 Whatever his motivation,
Cardozo did devote himself to the law, and after two decades of

93. See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 12-19. The two other Supreme Court judges
investigated and charged alongside Cardozo were both convicted and removed from
office. See id. at 19.
94. See id. at 27-50.
95. See id. at 119 ("There was a personal aspect to Cardozo's nomination that must
have been extraordinarily important to him. He had grown up in the shadow of his
father's disgrace. He came to grips with the past by challenging it. When the time
came, Cardozo chose the law, and indeed he chose his father's law firm.").
96. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 5 ("The disgrace of Cardozo's father is a fact; given
Cardozo's sensitivity and pride in family, it must have stung, but with what effect to his
career it is impossible to say. Cardozo's opinions and extrajudicial writings display a
strong streak of moralism, but this is easily accounted for without supposing that he was

trying to compensate for his father's moral derelictions."); RCHARD POLENBERG, THE
CARDozo 33 (1997) ("Many writers have asserted, although without

WORLD OF BENJAMIN

supporting evidence, that Benjamin devoted his life to clearing the family name ....
These assertions, however, depend on a series of unlikely propositions: that Benjamin
believed that his father had dishonored the family name, that his own behavior could
somehow redeem it, and that it made sense to devote his life to such a purpose.").
Joseph Rauh, Justice Cardozo's final clerk on the U.S. Supreme Court, recalls that
"there was widespread discussion, in New Deal days and since, that Justice Cardozo was
seeking to make up for the alleged wrongdoings of his father, a Tweed Ring judge
forced to resign from the bench. I never heard Justice Cardozo mention his father or
give the slightest hint that he carried any family burden or humiliation." Joseph L.
Rauh, Jr., A Personal View ofJustice Benjamin N. Cardozo: Recollections of Four Cardozo Law
Clerks, 1 CARDOZO L. REv. 5, 9 (1979). Apparently the only statement Cardozo himself
ever expressed was to Burlingham, who remembers that "I once had the effrontery to
ask him about his father. . . . He said, J know nothing about it. I know he was a very
good Dad." Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 11.
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success at the bar, he was highly respected as a "lawyer's lawyer." 9 7
It was only natural that in 1913, Fusion's judicial selectors would
view him has an attractive candidate for the bench, and that he in
turn would welcome their support. When Burlingham offered him
the Supreme Court nomination, "Cardozo, a Democrat who had
once turned Burlingham down on a judgeship offer, accepted this
time," as "[e]lection would be redemption." 9 8
The Progressives endorsed the choice of Cardozo to run alongside the Democrat Philbin, but the Republicans publicly balked.
Having already been denied the mayoral nomination, GOP leaders
wanted one of their own among the Supreme Court nominees.
The opposition was spearheaded by Samuel Koenig, the New York
County Republican Chairman who had special incentive to dislike
Cardozo. 9 9 Koenig in 1912 had participated in the unsuccessful appeal to the New York Supreme Court of the conviction of Charles
Katz for conspiracy to steal a large amount of mining stock. 100 In
early 1913, Cardozo was brought in to argue the case before the
state Court of Appeals, 10 1 and declined Koenig's services, "an omission that probably helped make Koenig a political opponent later
that year." 10 2 Otto Bannard, a former Republican candidate for
mayor, arranged a meeting between Burlingham and Koenig. Koenig told Burlingham: "I don't want your friend Cardozo."10 3 Burlingham responded that if Koenig had objections to Cardozo he
should have raised them earlier. Cardozo already had accepted an
offer for a position he had not sought, and it was too late to with04
draw his name. Koenig backed down, persuaded by Burlingham.1
Cardozo subsequently was elected to the Supreme Court on Novem97. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 98-99 ("Cardozo occupied a special niche in the
hierarchy of legal practice ...he was sought after by an ever-widening circle of lawyers
to handle difficult litigation... Cardozo was a first-rate litigator, especially in the appellate courts. When their clients were in trouble, New York lawyers knew they could turn
to Cardozo.").
98. Id. at 119.
99. See id. at 119-20.
100. See People v. Katz, 154 A.D. 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
101.
See People v. Katz, 209 N.Y. 311 (N.Y. 1913).
102. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 108.
103. Id. at 120.
104. See id.
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ber 4, 1913, took his seat on January 5, 1914, and only five weeks
10 5
later accepted a designation to the Court of Appeals.

The following is a summary of those points about which we can
be confident. First, the relevant timeline begins with Taft's election
in November 1908. He and Wickersham formally assumed their offices in March 1909. Cardozo was nominated and elected to the
New York Supreme Court in the summer and fall of 1913, but the
period in which Wickersham and Burlingham could have approached Cardozo would have ended even earlier. Taft was defeated by Woodrow Wilson in November 1912, and Wickersham's
service was concluded by the inauguration of the new President in
March 1913. Thus, any offer of a federal judgeship to Cardozo
from Wickersham (via Burlingham) must have been made between
late 1908 and early 1913. Second, during these four and a half
years there were only two openings on the Southern District. The
fourth seat created by Congress in February 1909 went to Hand in
April 1909. The vacancy after Adams's death in October 1911 was
filled by Mayer in February 1912. Therefore, it must have been either Hand or Mayer that was, at best, the second choice of the Taft
administration at the time of his nomination.
II.

HYPOTHESES

After an exhaustive search of the available materials, I am prepared to conclude that no evidence exists to definitively prove that
the offer to Cardozo was made in 1909. That said, I do believe I can
persuasively demonstrate that the offer was not made in 1912. This
Part discusses potential explanations that both support and challenge my theory.
A.

The 1909 Nomination

The inauguration of William Howard Taft in March 1909 ostensibly was a heady time for the new President. Taft had bested his
Democratic opponent in the 1908 election, William Jennings
Bryan, by over 1.2 million votes (of almost 15 million cast) and won
105.

See id. at 125-29.
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the Electoral College 321 to 162.106 Taft carried New York by more
10 7
than 200,000 votes, a larger majority than he had anticipated.
Appearances were deceiving, however, and the decisive win temporarily masked a discomfiting reality. Taft's margin of victory was less
than half of that received by the wildly popular Teddy Roosevelt
only four years earlier. Taft lost a number of states Roosevelt had
won, and Democratic governors were elected in many states that
had voted for the national Republican ticket.10 8 And as voters had
begun to desert the GOP, the party was showing signs of dissent
from within. An ominous fissure had developed during the
Roosevelt administration between progressive and conservative
Republicans in Congress, and a full-scale revolt loomed in the near
future. 10 9 "The Republican party that William Howard Taft inherited was already a house divided against itself," but as "both progressive and conservative factions of the party turned from the old
occupant of the White House to the new they saw what they
thought was good and claimed the new man as one of their
own." 110 Thus Taft assumed office under less than ideal circumstances, but he still enjoyed sufficient political strength to announce and follow through on his intention to make solely meritbased appointments to the federal judiciary.
1. Taft & Merit-Based Nominations
The issue of a competent judiciary was one of particular salience for Taft. Many of our nation's chief executives have been lawyers, but no president before or since has had comparable
experience as a jurist. Taft commenced his career as a county prosecutor in Ohio, and was soon appointed a judge of the Superior
Court of Cincinnati. In 1890, he was named United States Solicitor
General (at age thirty-two) and, in 1892, appointed to the newly
created Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. While on the bench he was
106.

See

FRANCIS MCHALE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF JUSTICE: THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SER-

155-56 (1931).
107. See id. at 156; 1 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT 377 (1939).
108.
See 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 377-78; GEORGE E. MOWRY, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 31-32 (1946).
109.
See MOWRy, supra note 108, at 32-35.
110. Id. at 35, 36.
VICES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT
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also the Dean of the University of Cincinnati Law School. After a
twelve-year foray into the executive branch - Taft was the first Civil
Governor of the Philippine Islands from 1901 to 1904, Secretary of
War under Roosevelt from 1904 to 1908, and President from 1909
to 1913 - he returned to the law, teaching at Yale and serving as
President of the American Bar Association until appointed Chief
Justice of the United States in 1921.111 Taft was too contemplative
and judicious to effectively manage the affairs of the national government, and he ultimately would be viewed a far more able judge
than executive. 1 1 2 Perhaps most important, although he disdained
partisan politics, "Taft worshipped the law."1 13 His lifelong dream
was to be ChiefJustice," 4 to be expected of a man who once stated:
"I love judges and I love courts. They are my ideals on earth of
'11 5
Apwhat we shall meet afterward in Heaven under a just God."
judge
a
qualifications
the
knew
better
propriately, "[n] o President
should have," and Taft had plenty of occasions to exercise his
knowledge. 1 6 During his four years in the White House, Taft made
six appointments to the Supreme Court, the most since President
Washington, and selected over forty percent of the lower federal
117
judiciary.
111. See generally I PRINGLE, supra note 107; 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (1939); McHALE, supra note 106.
112. Friend and political ally Elihu Root remembered that Taft "was by nature essentially ajudge." "His instincts were for the judicial mode of action. That is the way he
was built and it was always difficult for him to break away from that mode. It followed
from his judicial make-up that it was difficult for him to adjust to many of the duties of
executive office. He did not like to make those swift ex parte decisions which, whether
right or wrong, are so frequently necessary for an executive." Proceedings in Memory
of Chief Justice Taft, 285 U.S. v, xv (1931).
113.

1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 129.

114. As Taft signed the commission of Associate Justice Edward D. White to be
Chief Justice in December 1910, he remarked to Wickersham, sitting beside him:
"There is nothing I would have loved more than being chiefjustice of the United States
... I cannot help seeing the irony of the fact that I, who desired that office so much,
should now be singing the commission of another man." Id. at 535.
Daniel S. McHargue, President Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J.
115.
POLITICS 478, 478 (1950).
McHALE, supra note 106, at 247.
116.
See generally McHargue, supra note 115; Richard D. Friedman, The Transforma117.
tion in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 76-80 (1983). Taft appointed five Associate
Justices to the Supreme Court, and elevated Associate Justice White to the center chair.
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Taft wanted great judges, and he was never more frustrated
than when his efforts were impeded by extraneous considerations.
He made a "sincere attempt to elevate the quality of judicial appointments," and his "industry in searching for the best men is beyond dispute."1 18 Taft "felt in extreme degree his duty - as a sacred
duty - of making the best possible selections," and "often frankly
said that his most distressing and heartbreaking experiences in public office were those instances in which mediocre and unfit judicial
appointments were compelled by the exigencies of politics, or by
the requirement of senatorial courtesy." 119 During Taft's first
month in office, his brother made the mistake of passing along a
recommendation to appoint a man with whom he was personally
unacquainted, to which the President angrily replied:
Harry, I want you to tell them, anyone who comes to you,
that I am determined to raise the Judiciary of this country
to a higher level. I'll be damned if I appoint to the Bench
anyone who is not a great lawyer. I am getting... tired of
men recommending others for the Bench whom they
would not employ themselves where two dollars was
20
involved. 1
So it was that in 1909, President Taft raised the bar forjudicial nominees, and made clear that his search would be guided by a broader
standard than conventionally applied.
Taft began by reconceptualizing what was then (and remains
today) the dominant criterion: party affiliation. "His sole desire in
all instances was to obtain good judges," regardless of "whether they
were Democrats or Republicans." 121 Like most presidents, he usually opted for members of his own party, but less often than others.
Eighty-two percent of Taft's lower court nominees were Republican,
which ranks him one of the most bipartisan presidents of the last
century in this respect. 122 Three of the six Supreme Court appoin118.

1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 529.

119.
Proceedings in Memory of ChiefJustice Taft, 285 U.S. v, xiii (1931) (statement
of Sixth Circuit Judge Arthur C. Denison).
120. 1 ARCHIBALD W. BuTT, TAr AND ROOSEVELT: THE INTIMATE LETTERS OFARCHIE
BUTT, MILITARY AIDE 22 (1930).
121. McHALE, supra note 106, at 248.
122. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 50 (1999).
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tees chosen by Taft - including the ChiefJustice - were Democrats,

123
which ranks him the most bipartisan president in this category.
Taft's approach, especially with the Supreme Court, was to look to a
nominee's "real" politics, rather than party label. "To Taft a close
correlation of the political, social, and economic views of appointer
and appointee was a controlling factor, while co-membership in a
political party was a subsidiary consideration." 2 4 In other words,
while prospective nominees need not be Republican, they were ex25
pected to share Taft's ideology.'
At the outset of his administration Taft also made clear he
would be selective about whom he would rely upon for advice. The
published memoirs of Major Archibald W. Butt, the military aide
and close confidant of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, provide an
insider's account of the public and private lives of both men. 126
Major Butt wrote about an occasion less than one week into Taft's
term when the members of the Supreme Court called upon the
President at the White House, and talk turned to securing quality
judicial nominees. President Taft assured the assembled Justices: "I
have five lawyers in my cabinet and before they recommend the
appointment of a judge they will be pretty certain that the man is
worthy of the place."' 27 The most important among them unquestionably would be Attorney General Wickersham. Butt wrote that
Wickersham "is thought by the President to be the most brilliant
member of his Cabinet," and Taft stated in the early days of his
presidency: "I will give Wickersham one year and then I will proph28
esy that he will be the most popular public man in Washington."'
Taft would be disastrously mistaken, but not because Wickersham
performed poorly. Rather, it was Wickersham's doggedly faithful,
but also distinguished, commitment to Taft's agenda that would
make the Attorney General an enemy of Capitol Hill progressives
and a pariah among his former Wall Street clients. 129 Wicker123.
See McHargue, supra note 115, at 507.
124. Id. at 482.
125.
See Walter F. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. ChiefJustice Taft and Supreme Court
Appointments, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 159, 162-63.
126. See 1 Burr, supra note 120, at vii-x.
127. Id. at 4.
128.
Id. at 79.
129.

See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 714.
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sham's background as a New York corporate lawyer who defended
major banks and railroads rendered him particularly well qualified
to continue the antitrust policies of the Roosevelt administration,
and he was chosen primarily for this purpose. But so vigorously did
Wickersham pursue this task that byJune 1910, "the whole financial
world look [ed] upon Wickersham as the greatest traitor since Benedict Arnold," and many called for his resignation. 130 None was
forthcoming, however, as Wickersham was Taft's closest adviser
13
within the administration. 1
In addition to trustbusting, Wickersham's other duties as Attorney General included serving as the point man for Taft's crusade to
revitalize the federal judiciary. In 1909, when nominated, Wickersham had been one of the leading Republicans in New York. 132
Still, "Wickersham was no lackey: he was outspoken and energetic,
and though he had long been valued as a Republican adviser, his
counsel was high-minded and reform-oriented rather than narrowly
political." 13 3 These qualities would be crucial in the context ofjudicial appointments, and the premium Taft placed on exemplary
nominees, regardless of party affiliation, gave Wickersham broad license to seek the wisdom of political independents like
Burlingham.
2.

Wickersham's First Choice

Burlingham's pivotal role in this story requires close scrutiny of
his recollection of the timing and sequence of the 1909 nomination. Gunther implies that the moment the fourth judgeship on
the Southern District was created, Burlingham and his influential
allies immediately went to work on Hand's behalf: "Burlingham
knew both Wickersham and Henry Taft well and was eager to support Hand enthusiastically. As soon as Wickersham made clear that
he was looking for quality candidates, Hand supporters - especially
the bar leaders whom Wickersham respected - conveyed their rec130.

1 Burr, supra note 120, at 366. In four years the Taft Administration would

institute more antitrust actions than Roosevelt did in seven. See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAP'H-,
supra note 52, at 714; 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 656-77; MCHALE,

supra note 106, at 185-86, 23943.
131.
See 1 Burr, supra note 120, at 228.
132.
See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 714.
133. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 129.
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Burlingham, in his own words, tells the story as

I came to know Hand forty-odd years ago when he came
down from Albany and entered the office of Burrill,
Zabriskie & Burrill as a law clerk. My friend, his classmate
Charles Lowell Barlow, brought him to see me one day,
and we had a little talk about the law firms of the city and
the best road for a young lawyer to take. I have no recollection of what my advice was, but I cannot imagine that
Hand followed it. But it did not take long to see that this
was no ordinary young man, and a few years later, when
there was a vacancy in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, I suggested Hand's
name to Attorney General Wickersham and to President
Taft, who appointed him in April, 1909.135
Kaufman's version, on the other hand, has Wickersham approaching Burlingham about Cardozo: "In 1908 or 1909, United States Attorney General George Wickersham had Charles C. Burlingham ask
Cardozo if he would accept a judgeship on the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.' 36 The plain
implication of these two accounts is that Wickersham was the impetus behind the offer to Cardozo, and Burlingham the impetus behind the offer to Hand. In other words, it appears that Cardozo was
Wickersham's first choice, whereas Burlingham preferred Hand.
Wickersham was Attorney General, however, and his candidate naturally would be given first priority.
This understanding of the 1909 nomination is consistent both
with what we know about the events in question, as well as with what
we reasonably can infer. Burlingham has said repeatedly that he
did not initiate contact with Cardozo, stating as much once in an
interview with Kaufman and twice in interviews with the Columbia
University Oral History Project. Kaufman explains that "[m]y statement that Wickersham asked Burlingham to approach Cardozo was
based on Burlingham's statement to me that that was what had hap134.
135.

Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
Charles C. Burlingham, Judge Learned Hand, 60 HARV. L. Rsv. 330 (1947).

136.

KAUFMAN,

supra note 4, at 100-01.
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pened." 13 7 Burlingham similarly told his Columbia interviewers on
separate occasions that when Taft was President "I was asked to
tender a judgeship to Benjamin Cardozo," and that Wickersham
"asked me if I would seek Benjamin Cardozo and see whether he
would accept an appointment as United States District Judge for
the Southern [D]istrict of NewYork.'

t3

The same would be true in

1913, when Burlingham decided upon Cardozo as one of Fusion's
nominees for the New York Supreme Court only after the urgings
of Henry Moscowitz.

1 39

In fact, according to Burlingham, prior to Wickersham's intervention, he did not have a personal relationship with Cardozo.
Years later he recalled: "I didn't know Justice Benjamin Cardozo
very early," and referring to his meeting with Cardozo at Wickersham's behest, said, "[i] f I knew him before that, I'm not sure, but I
very likely didn't."'140

Burlingham and Hand, by contrast, were

quite close well before 1909. Hand met C.C.B. not long after he
moved to New York City in 1902, and his "acquaintance with Burlingham quickly flowered into a warm friendship." 14 1 Writes
Gunther:
C.C.B.'s affection for Learned was already evident in
1905, when Hand survived his life-threatening bout with
pneumonia. "It is a thing to be directly thankful for,"
C.C.B. wrote Hand, "that God has kept you here a bit
longer... I'd like to lay my eyes on you and hope I may
anon. This to the fire, with this sentimental rubbish 14 2
true though."
Although Burlingham later in life would consider himself and Cardozo to be "intimate friends,"' 43 it appears that early on Cardozo
was not on Burlingham's short list of handpicked judicial prospects.
It is not incorrect to state, as did Justice Frankfurter, that "the profession and the public are indebted more to C.C.B. than to any
other one person for the judicial career of Benjamin N. Car137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13.
Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 7, 9.
See supra text accompanying notes 90 to 92.
Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 9.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 108.
Id.
Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 11.
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dozo,' ' 14 4 but Burlingham's eager support initially was rendered

only upon the request of others. Considering Burlingham's close
relationship with Hand in 1909, and lack thereof with Cardozo at
that time, it would be unsurprising for C.C.B. to proactively recommend Hand's candidacy to Wickersham once Cardozo had declined the offer he had brought from the Attorney General.
As for Wickersham, one would expect that in 1909 he would be
far more familiar with Cardozo than Hand. Both Wickersham and
Cardozo were successful practitioners with established reputations,
albeit in different fields. "The staple of [Cardozo's] practice involved the ordinary business and personal affairs of middle-class
New York, not the litigation or the financing of large corporations.

'1 4 5

Wickersham, however, was one of the leading corporate

lawyers in New York, well recognized for his representation of railroads and banks. 146 Cardozo and Wickersham may not have shared
the same client base, but as Kaufman emphasizes, Cardozo was
widely known among members of the bar, and he took referrals
from and appeared as an adversary against many of the most prominent attorneys in New York. 147 Compare this to Hand, who "[i]n
1909 . . .after more than seven years of law practice in New York

City... had little to show for his efforts."1 48 In March of that same
year, President Taft told his brother Henry that he would not appoint anyone to the bench "who is not a great lawyer."1 4 9 Wickersham, himself a great lawyer, would have recognized the same of
Cardozo, and viewed him as an ideal candidate for the bench. This
would be especially true in the first thirty days of the Taft administration, when political ties were of limited relevance. Neither Cardozo nor Hand had any cachet within the GOP; choosing one or
the other would do little to excite the Republican party faithful.
But for the moment, such considerations were temporarily dormant. Taft and Wickersham simply wanted the most capable attor144. Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 436.
145. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 98.
146. See DICrIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 713-14.
147. See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 98-99.
148. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 107 ("In later years, Hand repeatedly told often
incredulous listeners about what he considered an utter failure: 'I was never any good
as a lawyer,' he said once in a public confession, 'Ididn't have any success, any at all.'").
149.
See supra text accompanying note 120.
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ney, and as between Cardozo and Hand, Cardozo better fulfilled
that job requirement.
3.

Burlingham's Memory

There are at least two problems with my tidy explanation for
the 1909 nomination. The first is that Gunther, who spent an extraordinary amount of time studying Hand's life,1 50 never saw any
evidence that Cardozo was first offered the same seat on the Southern District. In fact, Gunther has even compiled a list of those New
York City lawyers who in 1907 posed the stiffest competition to
Hand for the potential position; Cardozo's name is conspicuously
absent.15 1 There may be a fairly simple reason why Cardozo's name
did not come to Gunther's attention while researching Hand's
nomination. Gunther was "relying basically on Hand's own recol1 52
lection and interviews with him, as well as his correspondence. 1
It would not be unusual for Hand's contemporaneous writings to
display his unawareness of Cardozo rebuffing Burlingham, as Cardozo probably did so quietly and without fanfare, in a manner entirely consonant with his public and private demeanor. 15 3 But to
explain why Hand never said anything later in his career assumes
one of three scenarios: one, Hand knew about the 1909 offer to
Cardozo but declined to say anything to Gunther or others; two,
Hand never knew about the 1909 offer to Cardozo and thus could
not have informed anyone; or three, Hand never commented on
the 1909 offer to Cardozo because it was never made, or at least not
in 1909.
I believe that either the first or second explanation must be the
case, and discuss both at greater length below. 154 The third possibility, that any offer to Cardozo must have come after Hand had
already assumed the bench in 1909, requires concluding that Bur150. See Posner, supra note 15, at 512 (noting that Gunther's "book is also a work of
massive and scrupulous scholarship. The Learned Hand papers to which Gunther had
exclusive access in preparing the biography are said to consist of 100,000 documents.").
151.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 127-28. According to Gunther, Hand's principal
rivals were two New York City "reform lawyers," Lorenzo Semple, former leader of Citizens Union and an ally of the Republican Congressman Herbert Parsons, and Samuel
H. Ordway, an attorney prominent in "good government circles." Id.
152. Letter from Gunther to Hessler, supra note 14.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 321 to 326.
154. See infra text accompanying note 341.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

lingham's version of events was incorrect, the understandable product of the faulty memory of a very old man. Again, both Kaufman
and Gunther are at least amenable to this theory.1 55 The question
of whether Cardozo was initially offered the judgeship that eventually went to Hand has to date been addressed - albeit only briefly
and in a footnote - by one scholar. In a review of Kaufman's book,
Professor Richard Friedman writes:
It appears to me that, although the near centenarian Burlingham was remarkably clear-headed when Kaufman interviewed him four and a half decades later, the probable
explanation is that he got his dates wrong, and that the
approach he had in mind was made with respect to that
later vacancy [in 1912]; it appears that the federal selectors, like the state selectors who settled on Cardozo the
following year, were looking for, or at least favorably disposed to the choice of, a Jewish judge [i.e., Julius
15 6
Mayer].
I suspect that Friedman is wrong on both points, and will address
each in turn.
The primary source for Kaufman's anecdote about Burlingham
approaching Cardozo in 1908 or 1909 is Burlingham himself. More
specifically, Kaufman cites an author interview with Burlingham on
November 13, 1957, as well as the series of interviews that Burlingham gave to the Columbia University Oral History Project in January and February 1949.157 Kaufman does offer some corroborating
evidence in the form of a November 12, 1957, author interview with
- of all persons - Learned Hand, who also queried Cardozo about
his interest in becoming a federal judge, but Cardozo again declined, citing to Hand the same salary concerns he conveyed to Burlingham. Hand, however, could not remember the date of his
conversation with Cardozo.1 58 When contacted on the specific
155.
156.

See supra text accompanying notes 22 to 23.
See Friedman, supra note 15, at 1747 n.41.

157.

See

158.

KAUFMAN,

supra note 4, at 608 n.23.

See id. Hand told the same anecdote, but in slightly more detail, to another
Cardozo biographer many years earlier. See GEORGE S. HELLMAN, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: AMERICAN JUDGE 44 (1940). As I discuss at greater length in infra Section TV.A,
Hand was in all likelihood already on the bench when he spoke with Cardozo, raising
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point of the years 1908 or 1909, Kaufman reiterates: "I believe that
Charles Burlingham was my only source for those dates." 15 9
Granted, the easiest explanation for all of this confusion is that
Burlingham simply got his dates wrong; i.e., he erroneously
remembered approaching Cardozo in 1908 or 1909 about the recently-created fourth seat, when he actually may have done so in
1911 or 1912 for the vacancy following Adams's death. Such an
argument is hardly unreasonable. Burlingham was born on August
31, 1858, which means he was ninety years old during his sessions
with Columbia and ninety-eight at the time of his interview with
Kaufman. 160 Furthermore, a review of the transcripts from the Columbia Oral History Project reveals Burlingham to be a man with
an extraordinary recall of detail, but not entirely perfect.
Burlingham told his Cardozo story to Columbia on two separate occasions, a few weeks apart, in 1949. The preface to the transcripts highlights:
These interviews are among the earliest undertaken by
the Oral History Research Office, and the transcripts have
a checquered [sic] career. Correspondence in our files
shows that Mr. Burlingham intended to edit them, but
never got around to doing so, save for a few pages, submitted as an addendum to this memoir, in which he began a complete revision.
The reader is enjoined to bear in mind that he is reading
the spoken, rather than the written, word, and that Mr.
Burlingham at the time of these interviews was 91 [sic]
16 1
years old, though still remarkably alert.
At the first session, on January 14, 1949, Burlingham stated:
When William Howard Taft was President I was asked to
tender a judgeship to Benjamin Cardozo, but Cardozo
could not accept it because the salary was too small.
Then, when Mitchel was Mayor, we needed a judge who
was ajew and we didn't know who to choose. Some name
was suggested and Henry Moscowitz disagreed. He said
the possibility that he approached Cardozo bearing a second offer independent of the
one tendered by Burlingham.
159. Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13.
160. See DIcTIoNARY OF AMERICAN BIoGcRAPHY, supra note 32, at 87.
161.
Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at Preface.
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that the man who had been named was a modern radical
Jew and what we needed was a Portuguese Synagogue Jew.
We asked if he had anyone in mind. He named Benjamin
Cardozo. That was splendid for us and I went and tendered the new judgeship to him and he accepted. So I
invited, a short time later[,] several men to lunch including Otto Bannard and Samuel Koenig. They wanted to
withdraw this offer to Cardozo but I told them they were
too late and I refused to do it. Cardozo always said that
he was elected by the Italians in the Bronx because they
thought he was Italian. The reason he was a member of
the West Side Synagogue was because he wanted to be
162
buried with his ancestors.
At the second session on February 7, 1949, Burlingham told an almost identical story, but in far greater length and depth. After
describing his "first Cardozo episode" - the unsuccessful nomination in 1906 of Michael Cardozo, "a first cousin of Benjamin and a
very well-known lawyer in the firm of Cardozo and Nathan," for the
New York Supreme Court - Burlingham continued:
The next was when George Wickersham was Attorney
General. That was in Taft's time so it must have been
about the same period, between 1904 and 1908. George
was an intimate friend of mine and he asked me if I would
seek Benjamin Cardozo and see whether he would accept
an appointment as United States District Judge for the
Southern [D] istrict of New York. So I went to see him. If
I knew him before that, I'm not sure, but I very likely
didn't. I put it before him and he said, no, he couldn't
possibly do it because he had two sisters to support and
the pay was very small, something like $5,000 or $6,000
then. That ended the episode. But, from that time on I
knew him very slightly.
Then, in 1912, we formed a Committee of Independent
Citizens to elect a Mayor. We nominated John Purroy
Mitchel. I was the Chairman of the Committee on Judicial Law and [Nomi]nations. We put up a whole ticket.
The other members of that Committee, if I remember
rightly, were Darwin R. James of Brooklyn, William Jay
162.

Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 7-8.
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Schieffelin, Philip J. McCook, afterwards a Justice of the
Supreme Court, and another man who had been Superintendent of Bank Insurance, I think, but I've forgotten his
name. We had two judges of the General Sessions, and
one Justice of the Supreme Court, and one Judge of the
City Court. The former insurance superintendent was interested only in getting William R. Ransom nominated to
the City Court. It was mid-summer. Schieffelin was at Bar
Harbor. That left only three of the four of us. We nominated Charles C. Nutt to the General Sessions. He was
the finest criminal judge we'd ever seen in New York from
the beginning of time.
Then the Republicans were very anxious that William H.
Wadhams, of an Albany family living in New York, should
be nominated to the Supreme Court. But he was a second-rate man. We thought we had some political wisdom
and we thought we'd like to nominate a Jew for the Supreme Court. So we cast about and we lighted on one
named Frank. I'm not sure whether his name wasJuliusJ.
Frank or not. I know his office at the time was in 58 William Street. We were about to name him when I fell in
with Henry Moscowitz who was on the Committee and
had been a temporary Chairman before we selected as
Chairman of the big Committee Norman Hapgood. I
told him the situation. "Oh," he said, "You haven't got
the right kind of Jew. Frank is a Felix Adler Jew, a Modernist. The man you want to get [ ] is a realJew. I'll tell
you the man, Cardozo. He is on the Portuguese Synagogue." He didn't use the word, but he was Sephardic.
So I went to Cardozo and asked if he'd seek the nomination. By this time he had become quite a notable as a
referee appointed by judges in difficult cases. He'd
shown his great ability. And he consented. I feel quite
sure from talks with him later that he didn't expect to be
elected. But he was elected. He always used to say that he
was elected by the Italians in the Bronx. After his Orthodoxy, I remember his telling me that he stood by the Synagogue because he wished to be buried with his
63
ancestors. 1

163.

Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 9-11.
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In these two excerpts Burlingham specifically mentions three dates:
the year of Michael Cardozo's nomination for the New York Supreme Court (1906), the years when Taft was President (1904 to
1908), and the year the Fusion movement began meeting to decide
upon a mayoral nominee (1912). Two of the three are accurate;
Michael Cardozo was nominated in 1906,164 and the Fusion movement did coalesce in 1912.165 But, most significantly, Burlingham
does state that "Taft's time" was 1904 to 1908, when in fact it was
1908/9 to 1912/13.166
Burlingham's slip on this point is, concededly, a major error,
particularly when the dispute about the events of 1909 turns almost
exclusively on his memory as to dates. The mistake is all the more
intriguing considering the fact that Burlingham recalls other, far
more mundane points such as people's middle initials or address,
and at other times candidly admits his recollection is uncertain. Finally, notice the uncannily parallel structure used by Burlingham
both times he told the story. In particular, Cardozo refusing the
seat on the Southern District because of money concerns, Moscowitz recommending Cardozo because of his Sephardic heritage,
Cardozo attributing his victory to the mistaken votes of Bronx
Italians, and Cardozo's synagogue membership being motivated by
his desire to be buried with his ancestors. In sum, Burlingham displays an incredible memory for minutiae, but also makes a notable
misstatement on a key date.
That said, there are many problems with concluding that Burlingham's mistaken reference to the dates of the Taft administration means that the offer to Cardozo did not occur in 1909. The
first, but also most facile explanation is that Columbia may have
gotten the dates wrong. Burlingham's sessions were tape recorded,
164. He died inJuly 1906, after his nomination but before the election. See Michael
H. Cardozo Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 1906, at 7.
165. See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 117 ("Meetings were begun in December 1912
that led to a conference of anti-Tammany Democrats, Republicans, and Progressives
166. Taft was elected in November 1908 and inaugurated in March 1909, and defeated in November 1912 and left office in March 1913. Because Wickersham likely
would not have dispatched Burlingham to contact Cardozo before he was officially Attorney General - and, it must be remembered, before the fourth seat on the Southern
District even existed - the rest of this section will refer to the years of the Taft administration as 1909 to 1913.
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and transcripts then typed by a Columbia secretary listening to the
audio and reading the interviewers' notes. For this very reason, in
February 1949, Columbia sent Burlingham a "rough draft" of the
document, requesting his review "to make certain that this memoir
is historically accurate.' 1

67

Columbia was particularly concerned

that "[w] e might have missed a few names and dates," and asked
Burlingham to "[pilease pay no attention to typographical errors,
or to the chronological order of events. After you have assured us
that the material is correct, we will clean up the misspellings and
rearrange the order." 168 Despite repeated requests from Columbia,
by the time of his death a decade later Burlingham had edited only
a brief portion of the interviews, none involving Cardozo. 169 Had
C.C.B. completed the project, he may have caught the error,
whether it was his or Columbia's. If Burlingham did not, at least
Columbia presumably would have corrected the dates of Taft's presidency at the time the memoirs were placed in chronological order.
That neither Burlingham nor Columbia did so ultimately matters
little, however, as the specific reference to the Cardozo offer having
occurred in 1908 or 1909 must have come during Burlingham's interview with Kaufman.
In the first Columbia session Burlingham does not explicitly
mention a date, stating only that he approached Cardozo while Taft
was President. In the second session Burlingham says that he must
have made the offer between 1904 and 1908, which would have
been impossible. It is only in Kaufman's book that the date of the
Cardozo offer is given as 1908 or 1909. Therefore, Burlingham
must have said as much in his interview with Kaufman. After all, if
Kaufman were merely correcting Burlingham's inaccurate refer167.
Letter from Dean Albertson to Charles C. Burlingham (Feb. 27, 1949).
Id.
168.
169.
In the years following the interviews, Columbia engaged in a number of appeals to Burlingham to complete the project, some more persuasive than others. See,
e.g., Letter from Allan Nevins to Charles C. Burlingham (Oct. 23, 1949) ("Now that
autumn and cool weather are here, could we ask you to give a final glance at the valuable memoirs which you kindly furnished us?"); Letter from Dean Albertson to Charles
C. Burlingham (Feb. 21, 1950) ("We very much appreciate the trouble you have gone in
granting the interviews, but until you return them to us, history is no better off than
before."); Letter from Allan Nevins to Charles C. Burlingham (Apr. 18, 1951) ("This is
simply in the nature of a reminder that you still have the memoir manuscript which we
recorded over two years ago.").
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ence to the years of Taft's presidency, he probably would have written that Burlingham remembered approaching Cardozo at some
point between 1909 and 1913. Also, Kaufman's interview with Burlingham was one of the first steps he took in the forty-year process
of researching and writing about Cardozo. 170 He decided to undertake the project in the spring of 1957, and interviewed C.C.B. on
November 13th of that same year. 17 ' Burlingham's Columbia interviews, however, were not published until 1961, and would not have
72
been available to Kaufman prior to interviewing Burlingham.1
Therefore, although Kaufman probably later relied upon them for
additional context about the Cardozo offer, the reference to 1908
or 1909 must have been provided during his interview with
Burlingham.
Even assuming that Burlingham did specify the date as 1908 or
1909 when meeting with Kaufman in 1957, skeptics like Friedman
quite reasonably may point out that C.C.B. was ninety-eight years
old at the time. But this explanation is undermined by the many
attestations to Burlingham's extraordinary memory, even at the end
of his very long life. Kaufman is willing to concede that it is not
impossible for Burlingham to "have been off a couple of years in his
memory of when he approached Cardozo."173 That said, however,
while "it is true that Burlingham was very old when I interviewed
him," Kaufman's "strong impression at the time was that mentally
he was not only all there but that he was remarkably all there. Things
that he told me that I was able to check out turned out to be quite
accurate."' 7 4 Corroborating this assessment is Gunther, who also
170. See Kaye, supra note 6, at 1026 n.1 (noting the timing of the interview).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 157.
172. See Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, (publication date on cover). At the
time Columbia contacted Burlingham about the interviews, he was told the material
would be embargoed until the subject consented to its release. See Letter from Allan
Nevins to Charles C. Burlingham (Jan. 4, 1949). By the summer of 1957, in another
letter pleading with Burlingham to edit the transcript, Columbia reminded him: "[iun
no case will they be available to readers during the subject's lifetime without his permission." Letter from Joan Pring to Charles C. Burlingham (Jul. 11, 1957). Burlingham
died in 1959, and it is not clear why the interviews were not published until 1961. In
any event, it is obvious from the text of the interviews that in 1949 Burlingham himself
expected the material to remain unpublished for an unspecified, but lengthy, amount
of time. See infra note 339.
173. Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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interviewed Burlingham around this time, and similarly was amazed
at the sharpness of the older man's powers of recollection. "The
explanation I would least accept is that Burlingham remembered
his dates incorrectly. I interviewed Burlingham when he was about
to turn 100, and I have never seen anyone, certainly anyone of advanced age, who was clearer on dates than he. '17 5 The Columbia

interviewers found Burlingham to be "remarkably alert," 17 6 andJustice Frankfurter, in a posthumous tribute to Burlingham, said that
although "C.C.B. lived to be nearly 101 years old ... he reached this
venerable age with a mind as lively and voracious as ever, [and] a
memory accurate and uncluttered by irrelevant details ....
The date of the offer to Cardozo is, of course, not an irrelevant
detail. But Burlingham's error as to the dates of Taft's presidency
does not, by itself, make the 1909 hypothesis any less credible than
the 1912 hypothesis. In other words, inaccurately remembering the
offer as having been made between 1904 and 1908 simply means
that in this one instance Burlingham was wrong about the date of
any offer, but not that he was wrong about the 1909 offer in particular. Still, even assuming C.C.B. was incorrect with Columbia but
correct with Kaufman shows that Burlingham could be careless
about dates. C.C.B. told Kaufman that he approached Cardozo in
1908 or 1909. It is highly improbable any offer to Cardozo would
have come in 1908, while Taft was only President-elect, before Wickersham had been confirmed as Attorney General, and, most importantly, even prior to the creation of the fourth seat on the Southern
District in early 1909. The offer to Cardozo almost certainly must
have been made in March 1909, and in no interview has Burlingham, nor anyone else, specifically indicated as much.
Nevertheless, I believe that the offer to Cardozo was made in
1909. Admittedly, Burlingham's questionable memory and my reasonable guesswork are slim reeds upon which to rest entirely the
persuasiveness of the theory that Hand was the Taft administration's second choice. Again, I cannot demonstrate conclusively that
the 1909 offer was made to Cardozo first. I am thus left with the
175. Letter from Gunther to Hessler, supra note 14. That said, Gunther did also
"suspect the explanation that the offer was made in 1911 or 1912 is the most persuasive
one." Id.
176. See supra text accompanying note 161.
177. Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 440.
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challenge of proving a negative: that the offer to Cardozo was not
made in 1912. Fortunately, the evidence to support this proposition is exceedingly strong, if not overwhelming.
B.

The 1912 Nomination
It is axiomatic to assert that a lot can change in only a few short
years, but in this context the clich6 seems particularly apt. The Taft
administration of 1912 was no longer the Taft administration of
1909. This refers not to the President's personnel - indeed, the key
figures in this story remain the same - but rather to the surrounding political landscape, which had undergone a sea change. The
halcyon days of March 1909, when all competing factions each believed the new President to be a kindred spirit, had given way to the
chaos of an election year in which Taft's prospects for survival were
bleak. Political tensions barely discernible at the time of Taft's inauguration were fully exposed three years later. Internecine warfare was decimating the Republican party, and Theodore Roosevelt,
Taft's former friend and mentor, was threatening a crusade to reclaim the White House. In sum, as 1911 came to a close Taft was
engaged in a struggle to salvage his presidency. And amidst this
turmoil, there was a vacant seat on the Southern District of New
York that needed to be filled.
1. Republican Politics
If, as Professor Friedman posits, in 1912 "the federal selectors,
like the state selectors who settled on Cardozo the following year,
were looking for, or at least favorably disposed to, the choice of a
Jewish judge,'

178

one would expect some evidence exists to bolster

this contention. For example, the pivotal role of Cardozo'sJudaism
in his 1913 nomination for the New York Supreme Court is well
documented.1 79 Mayer's religion similarly had been the primary
reason he received an earlier judicial post, his appointment to the
New York Court of Special Sessions in 1902.180 But the materials
178. See supra text accompanying note 156.
179. See supra text accompanying note 92.
180. According to Boss Platt, following the election of the independent Seth Low as
New York City mayor in 1901, "Low had one Judge of the Special Sessions Court to
name. He for a long time refused to consider the claims of any Republican. He insisted that he must have a Hebrew Democrat. There were more conferences between
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detailing Mayer's nomination to the Southern District in 1912
counsel a different conclusion: that partisan politics, rather than
religious considerations, were a more likely motivation. The National Archives maintains the letters submitted to the president and
attorney general in support or protest of federal judicial nominees.
A search of the records of the Department of Justice for information about the appointments of Hand and Mayer to the Southern
District revealed, surprisingly, no material about Hand but two files
on Mayer.1 81 These files contain twenty-seven letters prompted by
Mayer's 1912 appointment, and all were favorable. Almost entirely
1 2
missing, however, is any reference to the fact Mayer is Jewish.
What the letters do strongly demonstrate is Mayer's high profile within the legal community generally, and his sterling credentials in the Republican Party specifically. As to his professional
acumen, Mayer's influential recommenders praised his performance in each of the varied posts he had held in his legal career.
Judge Werner of the New York Court of Appeals noted that "as a
lawyer [Mayer] has always enjoyed the fullest confidence of the
courts and prestige of a very high reputation among his fellow
members of the bar."1813 Former New York City Mayor Seth Low,
who earlier had placed Mayer on the bench, assured Taft that
"[w]hen I appointed him Mr. Mayer had been, for a number of
years, Counsel of the Excise Board, and in that capacity he had
Low and Morris over this appointment than over any other except perhaps that of McDougall Hawkes. Morris from the outset maintained that a Republican should be selected, and kept urging Julius M. Mayer, a Republican Hebrew. The Mayor finally
agreed to appoint him if I would make a personal request. I did so, and Mayer went
upon the bench." PATr, supra note 64, at 417.
181.
See Letter from Fred Romanski, Archivist, Civilian Records, Textual Archives
Services Division, National Archives and Records Administration to Stephen Hessler
(Jul. 13, 2000). Gunther searched unsuccessfully for several years for Hand's files, and
believes they were lost when Attorney General William P. Rogers removed them for
information to prepare a tribute to Hand at a ceremony commemorating his fiftieth
year on the bench. See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 701 n.94.
182. Only one person, Leopold Plant, President of United Hebrew Charities and a
Manager of the Jewish Protectory and Aid Society, mentioned Mayer's Judaism. But
Plant wrote to laud Mayer's service as a former head of the Protectory in response to
Florence Kelley's charges that Mayer had misused his authority in this capacity to thwart
efforts to pass anti-child labor legislation. See Letter from Plant to Taft, supra note 83.
See also supra notes 80 to 81 (detailing Kelley's allegations).
183. Letter from Judge William E. Werner, New York Court of Appeals to President
William H. Taft (Dec. 27, 1911).
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been so just and fair as to win approval of all the better elements of
the city," and "[a] s Justice of the Court of Special Sessions, he confirmed, upon the same elements in the community, the favorable
impression which he had made." 184 Judge Hiscock of the New York
Court of Appeals "[felt] sure that at the conclusion of his term
[Mayer] was regarded as one of the ablest Attorney Generals whom
we have had in many years," a sentiment echoed by his colleague
Judge Werner. 1 85 By mid-January 1911, four of the members of the
New York Court of Appeals had written either Taft or Wickersham
in support of Mayer's candidacy, 18 6 as did one federal judge from
the Western District of New York, 18 7 three state Supreme Court jus1 89
tices,' 88 and assorted other lower judicial and civil officeholders.
Even more interesting, however, is the enthusiastic support
Mayer enjoyed from GOP stalwarts. Otto Bannard, a former GOP
candidate for New York City Mayor and one of Taft's closest personal friends, 90 wrote the President in early December 1911 that "I
understand that the name of the Hon. Julius M. Mayer has been
suggested to fill the vacancy on the Federal Bench in this District
caused by the death of District Judge Adams," and spoke warmly of
Mayer. 191 Among those suggesting Mayer's name was Samuel Koenig, the powerful President of the New York County Republican
184. Letter from Low to Taft, supra note 64.
185. Letter from Judge Frank H. Hiscock, New York Court of Appeals to President
William H. Taft (Dec. 26, 1911); Letter from Werner to Taft, supra note 183 ("It is a
matter of history that [Mayer] was one of the most able and efficient Attorney General's
the State of New York has ever had.").
186. Id. See also Letter from Judge Emory A. Chase, New York Court of Appeals to
President William H. Taft (Dec. 26, 1911); Letter from Judge Edgar M. Cullen, New
York Court of Appeals to Attorney General George W. Wickersham (Jan. 16, 1912).
187. See Letter from United States District Court Judge John Hazel, Western District of New York to President William H. Taft (Feb. 9, 1912).
188. See Letter from Justice M.W. Hirschberg, Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department to President William H. Taft (Dec. 26, 1911); Letter from Justice
Walter Lloyd Smith, Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department to President William H. Taft (Dec. 26, 1911).
189. See Letter from Justice F. Spiegelberg, Municipal Court of the City of New
York, Borough of Manhattan, Fifth District to President William H. Taft (Jan. 2, 1912);
Letter from White to Taft, supra note 83; Letter from McAdoo to Taft, supra note 83.
190.
See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 1071 (noting that Taft knew Bannard
"though all his adult years and with whom he had corresponded as much as with any
person except members of his family").
191.
Letter from Otto Bannard, President, The New York Trust Company to President William H. Taft (Dec. 6, 1911).
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Committee - the same man who less than two years later would
attempt to block Cardozo's nomination to the state Supreme Court
for personal and political reasons 9 2 - and he took care to see that
Mayer stood in good stead. On December 5, 1911, he wrote General Wickersham because " [i] t has come to my notice that inquiries
were being made today concerning a lawyer named Charles F.
Mayer." 193 Koenig clarified that "[t]he name submitted to you is
that of Hon. Julius M. Mayer and I hope this mistake will not result
in any confusion." As a final reminder, Koenig added: "P.S. I spoke
to [New York Republican Congressman Herbert] Parsons yesterday
and he tells me that in his judgment within two years Mayer will be
194
the strongestJudge on that bench with the exception of Hough."
Finally, Lloyd Griscom, described by Gunther as one of the two
most powerful Republicans in New York City at this time (the other
being Rep. Parsons), 19 5 was even more direct. On December 8,
1911, he informed Wickersham: "I sincerely hope that [Mayer's]
candidacy will have your hearty endorsement both as Attorney General and as a fellow citizen. Anything that is done by the President
for Mr. Mayer will place me, together with many other of his
1 96
friends, under deep personal obligation."

If Friedman is correct and the Taft administration in 1912 mirrored the New York political establishment in 1913 in their preference for the nomination of a Jewish judge, why would this same
reasoning not apply when appointing Hand, who was not Jewish,
three years earlier? 197 The judge Mayer replaced, the deceased
192.
See supra text accompanying notes 99 to 104.
193.
Letter from Samuel S. Koenig, President, Republican County Committee, New
York to Attorney General George W. Wickersham (Dec. 5, 1911).
194.
Id.
195.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 204. During the Roosevelt administration Griscom had served as minister to Japan, ambassador to Brazil, and ambassador to Italy. He
also preceded Koenig as head of the New York County Republican Committee (from
1910-11), but resigned after he was unable to unite the Taft and Roosevelt factions of

the party. See

DICrIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY

253-54 (Supp. 6 1980).

196. Letter from Lloyd C. Griscom to Attorney General George W. Wickersham
(Dec. 8, 1911).
197. For that matter, why would this same reasoning not also apply at the time of
the first vacancy after Mayer's appointment? Judge Holt resigned in January 1914 and
his replacement was Gus Hand, Learned's non-Jewish cousin. See supra text accompanying notes 85 to 86.
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George Adams, presumably was notJewish. 19 8 Rather than assume
Mayer's appointment was part of an effort to placate a powerful
religious constituency, as was the case with Cardozo's nomination
in 1913, I believe it makes far more sense to attribute Mayer's selection to GOP political considerations. Indeed, when viewed in the
context of the national and New York political climate at that time,
it becomes increasingly obvious why Cardozo would be a more attractive candidate than Hand in 1909, but a less desirable choice
than Mayer in 1912, and in neither instance is religion a significant
factor.
2.

Taft, Roosevelt & the Progressives

When elected president in 1908, Taft was perceived, quite accurately, to be Roosevelt's anointed heir. The two men had fostered an extraordinarily close relationship over the prior six years.
In October 1902, while Taft was governor of the Philippines,
Roosevelt sought to nominate him an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Taft desired nothing more than to be Chief Justice,
but believed his current work implementing economic and political
reform in the Islands too important to leave at that time, and he
declined Roosevelt's insistent offers. Only a few months later, Secretary of War Elihu Root announced he was leaving the administration, and Roosevelt again turned to Taft. This time Roosevelt
refused to take no for an answer; governing the Philippines fell
within the War Department's purview, so Taft had no grounds to
object. He accepted, and by year's end departed for
Washington. 199
Roosevelt was reelected handily in 1904, and by the end of his
term speculation as to a Republican successor turned to the two
most trusted members of his cabinet, Taft and Root (who had returned as Secretary of State in 1905). Root's background as a corporate lawyer meant he would be viewed as too conservative for
much of the country and, in any event, he did not want the nomination. There was some interest in Charles Evans Hughes, then gover198. Adams died on October 9, 1911. His obituary does not state his religion, and
lists his civic associations as the Bar Association, the Union League and the Ardsley
Clubs. See Judge George B. Adams Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1911.

199.

See 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 237-55;

McHALE,

supra note 106, at 94-103.
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nor of New York, but he was a reluctant candidate and Roosevelt
was not particularly fond of him. Roosevelt decided on Taft, who
still pined to be Chief Justice (and was at the time considering a
second offer from Roosevelt for another Associate Justiceship), but
also felt he could not refuse the presidential nomination. Taft's
candidacy initially was opposed by conservative Republicans, ironic
in light of future events. Taft had been a staunch and vocal defender of Roosevelt's progressive policies, and had even committed
himself to a downward revision of the tariff, an issue that was anathema to conservative protectionist interests. Some reassurance was
provided by selecting conservative New York Congressman James
Sherman to be Taft's running mate, and when the Democrats nominated William Jennings Bryan and his platform of public ownership of the railroads, conservative Republicans had little choice but
to join their progressive brethren in supporting Taft. Roosevelt
worked tirelessly to ensure the victory of his handpicked candidate.2 0 0 The "nation knew that a vote for Taft was a vote for
Roosevelt," and almost fifty-five percent of the electorate responded
20 1
favorably.
Thus Taft was thought to be the second coming of Roosevelt,
but in this role he was destined to disappoint. "The Colonel," as
the former Rough Rider war hero was known to his adoring public,
had been governor of New York for only two years when tapped to
run on President's McKinley's reelection ticket, and vice president
for barely six months when McKinley was assassinated. 20 2 Energetic
and opportunistic by nature, at only forty-three Roosevelt was the
youngest man ever to occupy the White House. Although an accidental president, he was beholden to few, having made no promises
to secure his office. He had the spirit of a reformer, and was drawn
to the aims of the nascent progressive movement: an active and
honest government, a more equitable redistribution of wealth, and
the increased regulation of corporations. Until 1904, Roosevelt
hewed to the conservative line just enough to ensure his renomination by the Republicans. Upon election to a full term of his own,
200.
MowRy,
201.
202.

See 1 PINGLE, supra note 107, at 311-78; McHALE, supra note 106, at 118-56;
supra note 108, at 29-31.
1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 355.
See H.W. BRANDS, T.R.: THE LAST Ro-Nr'ic 358-416 (1997).
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he immediately declared that under no circumstances would he be
a candidate for a second full term in 1908. This gave him political
independence, but foreclosing reelection was a decision he later
would regret. Progressive Republicans were gaining both numbers
and strength in Congress, and Roosevelt increasingly supported
their challenges to the GOP's conservative leadership. Roosevelt
advocated far more than he accomplished, but his aggressive use of
the bully pulpit effectively launched the progressive movement. In
doing so, Roosevelt placed Taft in an awful dilemma. 20 3 "For the
outgoing president left to his successor a progressive country demanding that much be done. He had also bestowed on him a Congress dominated by conservatives who had stoutly set their faces in
the opposite direction." 20 4 It would be impossible for any one Republican to placate both factions, as both Taft and Roosevelt soon
learned.
The Taft administration was beset by problems from the start.
Less than three weeks after Taft's inauguration on March 4, 1909,
Roosevelt set sail for almost a year and a half of hunting big game
in Africa and visiting European heads of state. Taft's first initiative
was to immediately convene a special session of Congress to enact
tariff reform. But before any substantive work could begin, thirty
progressive Republicans crossed the aisle to join their Democratic
colleagues in an attempt to oust Republican House Speaker "Uncle
Joe" Cannon, an archconservative who refused to allow floor votes
on progressive legislation. Taft personally disapproved of Cannon
and his obstructionist tactics, but the conservative hierarchy promised to support tariff reform in exchange for the President's backing the Speaker's reelection. Taft begrudgingly agreed, and the
progressives were incensed. 20 5 Only days into his term, Taft "had
sacrificed, utterly and completely the earlier confidence of the
insurgents."

20 6

To make matters worse, Taft's political gambit backfired miserably. The President and the progressives sought deeper cuts in the
tariff rate schedules than the GOP leadership would allow, and in
203.
204.
205.
206.

See MowRY, supra note 108, at 9-35.
Id. at 35.
See 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 399417; MOWRY, supra note 108, at 4044.
1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 409.
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August 1909 Taft signed into law a bill that effected little genuine
change. Special interests remained protected by high rates, and average consumers blamed the tariff for the rising cost of living. Any
opportunity for public understanding that this was the best possible
legislation under the circumstances was lost when Taft went on a
nationwide speaking tour that fall and overenthusiastically defended "the best tariff bill that the Republican party has ever passed
and therefore the best tariff bill that has been passed at all. ' 20

7

In a

purely technical sense Taft was correct; Roosevelt and his GOP
predecessors had been unwilling to engage in the politically perilous task of tariff reform. But the voters more broadly perceived a
betrayal of Roosevelt's progressive legacy, and the newspapers began clamoring for the Colonel's return from Africa and into the
White House in 1912.208
Roosevelt may have been enough of a pragmatist to empathize
with Taft's political woes on the tariff, but matters would soon become more personal in the so-called Ballinger-Pinchot affair. In
mid-1909, a young aide in the Interior Department, Louis Glavis,
presented to Taft a report alleging that Interior Secretary Richard
Ballinger fraudulently was approving the sale to wealthy coal mining interests of thousands of acres of Alaskan land set aside by
Roosevelt for conservation purposes. Taft, assured by Ballinger the
charges were baseless, fired Glavis for insubordination. In November 1909, Glavis proceeded to publish his findings in a national
newsmagazine, and his cause was taken up within the administration by Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot had been retained
from the previous administration, and was Roosevelt's close friend
as well as the public face of his prized conservation programs. For
weeks Pinchot publicly attacked Ballinger's (and therefore Taft's)
commitment to conservation. Pinchot essentially was challenging
the president to fire him, but Taft was hesitant to do so, lest his
action be viewed as a repudiation of Roosevelt. But Pinchot eventually revealed he had been providing confidential government documents to Glavis and congressional progressives, and Taft had no
choice but to terminate him. Congress convened sensational hear207.
208.
MOWRY,

MowRY, supra note 108, at 70.
See I PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 418-57; MCHALE, supra note 106, at 190-201;
supra note 108, at 44-71.
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ings from January to May 1910, and ultimately issued a report exonerating Ballinger. 20 9 But the damage had already been done. The
progressives had vilified Taft and his cabinet as enemies of conservation, and Pinchot departed for Europe to meet with Roosevelt
and apprise him of current events. By now it was painfully obvious
to Taft (and all others) that the progressives were engaged in a coordinated campaign to discredit him in Roosevelt's eyes, and provoke a formal split between the two. Despite his earlier progressive
leanings, Taft's instinctive response was to seek refuge among the
more conservative elements of his party, who welcomed him with
open arms. Roosevelt was due home in one month's time, and all
210
sides awaited his reaction to Taft's first year in office.
On June 18, 1910, Roosevelt received a hero's welcome when
he sailed into New York harbor amidst a naval flotilla. Taft watched
with a wary eye as Roosevelt promptly was visited at his home in
Oyster Bay, New York, by prominent progressives dissatisfied with
his successor, and received their pleas to return to active political
life. 2 1' The opportunity for his comeback did not take long to materialize. Less than two weeks after his homecoming, Roosevelt was
persuaded by then-New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes to
publicly endorse pending legislation that would abolish the party
convention system for nominating state officials in favor of a direct
primary. Taft supported the bill as well, but more quietly. When it
was soundly defeated by the "Old Guard," Taft was discouraged, but
for Roosevelt "the setback was a personal defeat which demanded
209. One casualty of the hearings was Wickersham. The investigating committee
asked Taft to submit the evidence he relied upon in authorizing Ballinger to fire Glavis.
The President provided a lengthy report bearing the date September 11, 1909, two days
prior to Glavis' dismissal. But Glavis's counsel during the hearings, Boston attorney
Louis Brandeis, elicited the damning admission that the report had not been written by
Wickersham until later that fall, and thus could not have been considered by Taft on
the date claimed. Whether Taft and Wickersham intended to mislead is disputed, but
the credibility of the Attorney General and President were seriously questioned. "The
predating of public papers is common enough. But the falsehoods surrounding the
document in addition to its predating further convinced the public of official skullduggery." Mowiv, supra note 108, at 85. See also I PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 510-13.
210. See 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 470-514; MCHALE, supra note 106, at 208-13;
MowRy, supra note 108, at 73-87; 1 Burr, supra note 120, at 244-45, 253-56, 310-12, 34850.
211. See 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 548-55; MCHALE, supra note 106, at 257;
MowRy, supra note 108, at 120-26; 1 Burr, supra note 120, at 415-16.

2003]

CARDOZO & HAND

vindication. It was doubly impossible, now, for him to dwell quietly
2 12
at Oyster Bay."
Roosevelt swiftly inserted himself into the fall 1910 New York
gubernatorial campaign. In August, GOP leaders met to recommend a temporary chairman for the upcoming state convention to
nominate the Republican candidate for governor. Roosevelt announced he wanted the post, but the party bosses responded by
naming Taft's vice president, Jim Sherman, a staunch conservative.
Taft privately was pleased by the humiliation of Roosevelt, but when
the press characterized the story as Taft rebuking Roosevelt, a truce
was arranged. When the full convention met in late September,
Taft supported Roosevelt for temporary chairman over Sherman
and the Old Guard. In return, Roosevelt delivered a speech praising the Taft administration and he secured the nomination of his
213
candidate Henry Stimson for governor.
The peace would be short-lived, however, as the 1910 midterm
elections were a disaster for the Republicans, both nationally and in
New York. The Democrats became a majority of fifty seats in the
House and gained eight seats in the Senate. In New York, conservative Republicans had portrayed the governor's race as a referendum
on Roosevelt and advocated sacrificing Stimson in 1910 to discourage Roosevelt from seeking the presidency in 1912. The result was
the election of Democrat John Dix as governor. Both Roosevelt
and Taft had been embarrassed by the Democratic landslide at the
polls, but Taft, as the incumbent president, inevitably must have
understood that all his subsequent actions - including his judicial
appointments - would be undertaken with only twenty-four months
remaining to repair his damaged political future. Roosevelt took
the rejection personally, ostensibly retired from public life once
2 14
again, and retreated to Oyster Bay, but not for long.

Although Roosevelt was quiet for the first half of 1911, Taft's
fortunes continued to falter. First, the progressives escalated their
212. 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 560-61.
MOwRY, supra note 108, at 135.

See also McHALE, supra note 106, at 257;

213. See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 563-65, 575-77; MCHALE, supra note 106, at
257; MowRY, supra note 108, at 135-42, 148-50; 2 ARCHIBALD W. BuTT, TA-r AND
ROOSEVELT: THE INTIMATE LETTERS OF ARCHIE BuTT, MILITARY AIDE 544-45 (1930).
214. See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 578-79; MCHALE, supra note 106, at 226-29;
MOWRY, supra note 108, at 154-56; 2 Burr, supra note 213, at 549-56.
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assault against him. With a Democratic House and nominally Republican Senate, the progressives controlled the swing votes necessary for any legislative success. 2 15 In January 1911, a sizable group
of progressive governors, senators, representatives and other notable persons formed the National Progressive Republican League.
The organization officially was founded to advance specific reforms,
"[b]ut no one doubted that its fundamental raison d'etre was to
defeat Taft for the renomination in 1912."216 Second, in April
1911, Taft learned that his own Vice President was seeking support
among New York conservatives to be the Republican presidential
nominee in the upcoming election. Taft professed to be unworried, but he was concerned enough that in May he appointed
Henry Stimson, the recently defeated GOP gubernatorial nominee
in New York, to be his Secretary of War. 2 17 Taft felt this appoint-

ment, "while it might not heal the differences in New York, would
at least have the effect of allying the Administration with the decent
element in that state." 2 18 Finally, Wickersham's aggressive enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was drawing fire from Wall
Street. 219 But, ironically, it was the administration's aggressive
trustbusting that would bring Roosevelt - the original enemy of the
trusts - roaring out of his self-imposed exile and into a primary
election contest with Taft.
On October 26, 1911, the Taft administration filed suit against
the United States Steel Corporation for antitrust violations. The
government's bill of equity featured the allegation that U.S. Steel's
monopolistic practices included its takeover of the Tennessee Coal,
Iron and Railroad Company during the financial panic of 1907 for
a price well beneath market value, a purchase specifically approved
by then-President Roosevelt. At the time, U.S. Steel representatives
informed Roosevelt that the merger was necessary to avoid an imminent economic disaster. The industrialists insisted that they were
motivated solely by a sense of public duty, and would proceed only
if assured no antitrust prosecution would follow. Roosevelt consented, given the dire consequences of inaction. Four years later,
215.

See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 604; MOWRY, supra note 108, at 165.

216.
217.
218.

MowRy, supra note 108, at 172.
See 2 Burr, supra note 213, at 629-30, 653-55.
Id. at 654.
See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 656-57; MOWRY, supra note 108, at 184.
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when the government filed suit, the obvious implication was that
Roosevelt had been either complicit in the scheme or duped by big
business. Neither conclusion was very favorable, and Roosevelt was
livid. In a national publication he vehemently defended his actions,
and launched a bitter counterattack on Taft personally. An overwhelming response to Roosevelt's article restored the self-confidence in his leadership that had been damaged by the 1910
midterm elections, and reignited popular interest in his potential
candidacy. Roosevelt soon indicated that if the people called, he
would serve, and by the end of 1911 it was clear he would challenge
22 0
Taft for the Republican presidential nomination.
3.

The New York Campaign

Judge George Adams of the Southern District of New York died
on October 9, 1911.221 Thus, during roughly the same period that
Taft and Wickersham were considering a replacement, they were
also confronting the emerging reality that Roosevelt would be a primary opponent. The two Presidents appealed to separate GOP
constituencies; Roosevelt commanded the allegiance of rank-andfile progressives, and Taft was the candidate of the Old Guard conservatives. But while Roosevelt may have enjoyed greater support
among Republican voters, Taft had the loyalty of the party bosses
who actually controlled the machinery by which delegates were selected.2 22 New York would be a particular focus of both men's attentions. The GOP nomination required 540 delegates at the
national convention in June 1912, and New York, with 90 delegates
at stake, represented one-sixth of that total.2 23 Both Roosevelt and
Taft were honest men who personally found machine politics repugnant, but campaigns were no time for idealism, and each solicited the assistance of the party bosses who could deliver.2 24 Most
interesting for present purposes, however, is that at the same time
Taft was shoring up the support of New York's most powerful
220.
See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 670-75; MOWRY, supra note 108, at 188-96; 2
Burr, supra note 213, at 811, 813.
221.
See supra text accompanying note 61.
222. See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 796-97; MowRy, supra note 108, at 226-28.
223. See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 771.
224. See id. at 772-74.
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Republicans, they were contacting him in return to urge the appointment of Julius Mayer to the Southern District.
On November 13, 1911, approximately two weeks after infuriating Roosevelt by filing suit against U.S. Steel, Taft wrote Samuel
Koenig - Chairman of the New York County Republican Committee and future opponent of Cardozo - "to tender to you and your
Committee my congratulations on the splendid showing in the recent [New York] campaign. We have reason to hope that next year
will see us victorious at the polls."

225

On December 9th, Taft wrote

dual letters, both marked "personal," to Lloyd Griscom and Congressman Herbert Parsons - "the two most powerful Republicans in
New York City," according to Gunther 26 - in response to their endorsement of Mayer's appointment. First, to Griscom:
I have yours of December 5th. I hope to be able to reach
a decision in the matter of an appointment to the District
Court in New York during the holiday recess of Congress,

and then send in the nomination as soon as Congress
reconvenes. Meantime, I shall discuss the matter with the
2 27
Attorney General.

Next, to Parsons, Taft was even more encouraging:
I have received your letter of the 7th instant. I expect to
discuss the matter of filling this vacancy with the Attorney
General. It has been my expectation to decide upon a
successor to the late Judge Adams during the holiday recess of Congress and send in the name soon after the
reassembling.

228

Beneath his signature, the following appears in Taft's barely legible
229
handwriting: "Shall be glad to consider Mayer's name."

Later that month Taft traveled to New York. En route, his military aide and constant companion Major Butt described the effect
of Roosevelt's incipient candidacy on Taft: "the trouble with the
Colonel hangs over him like a big black cloud and seems to be his
225.
226.
227.

Letter from President William H. Taft to Samuel S. Koenig (Nov. 13, 1911).
See supra note 195.
Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Lloyd C. Griscom (Dec. 9,

1911).
228.
229.

Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Herbert Parsons (Dec. 9, 1911).
Id.
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nemesis. He frets under it, I can see." 23 0 On the morning of December 20, 1911, President Taft invited his close friend and prominent Republican, Otto Bannard - who had written Taft in support
of Mayer only two weeks earlier - to breakfast at his brother Henry's
home in New York City to discuss Roosevelt's intentions. According
to Butt, Bannard thought Roosevelt would wait until 1916 to run
again, although Henry Taft disagreed. Afterwards, Taft "spent the
morning in the house, seeing politicians galore and coming to the
conclusion that things were not so bad in New York as he had been
led to suppose they were. ' 231 On the return trip to Washington, the
President expressed how his spirits had been bolstered by his meetings with the New York GOP hierarchy, telling Butt "of the good
that such a trip does him politically and that in this instance he felt
23 2
it was of incalculable good to him."
On December 26, 1911, Taft sent Koenig a handwritten note of
optimistic holiday greetings - "This is a good Christmas. I believe I
see light." - and included this P.S.: "I wrote to John Proctor Clark
about the judicial matter. He and his colleagues made such a recommendation as you would desire." 23 3 In this letter, a typed copy
of the handwritten original, Taft was likely referring to John Proctor Clarke, a former classmate at Yale and current Judge of the New
York Supreme Court, and quite probably was conveying favorable
news about Mayer. 2 34 Taft's active correspondence with the New
York Republican leaders continued into 1912. On February 2nd,
he again wrote to both Koenig and Parsons, thanking them for
"making it possible for the New York Committee to give such a
handsome endorsement of my Administration" at a meeting the
night before. 23 5 "I am under a very great debt of obligation to you
and Sam Koenig," Taft wrote to Parsons. 236 A little more than two
230.
231.
232.
233.

2 Burr, supra note 213, at 794.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 800.
Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Samuel S. Koenig (Dec. 26,

1911).
234. See McHALE, supra note 106, at 25 (describing Taft and Clarke as classmates at
Yale); Orr v. Orr, 133 N.Y.S. 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911) (indicating that in December
1911 Clarke was a Judge on the New York Supreme Court).
235. Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Samuel S. Koenig (Feb. 2,
1912).
236. Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Herbert Parsons (Feb. 2, 1912).
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weeks later, on February 19th, Taft formally sent Mayer's name to
23 7
the Senate.
To what extent the two events are directly related - Koenig,
Parsons, and Griscom having their candidate Mayer elevated to the
federal bench and Taft receiving their full support against
Roosevelt - cannot be determined with certainty. That said, a quick
glance at the ensuing New York campaign indicates that if Mayer's
nomination was a quid pro quo, Koenig, Parsons, and Griscom kept
their end of the bargain. On March 26, 1912, New York held its
primary, and party leaders like Koenig delivered for Taft, who won
eighty-three delegates to Roosevelt's seven. 238 "That corruption
239
marked the balloting is fairly certain," and Roosevelt cried foul.
He alleged that the "Old Guard" was stealing the election for Taft,
and lashed out at the President's (and Mayer's) allies:
[T] he President's political fortunes are now committed to
the political machines in the various States, which are led
and controlled by men like. .. Koenig in New York. ....
Mr. Koenig had been given the right to name all the inspectors at the primary election in the County of New
York and had already used that right to throw out over a
hundred of the inspectors simply because it was known
that they were supporting the Roosevelt ticket. . . . As I
have said, such a primary contest is not merely a farce but
a criminal farce. The men nominally elected as its result,
men like Mr. Parsons, Mr. Griscom, and the rest, cannot,
if they wish to preserve their reputations as honorable
240
men, consent to accept positions as delegates.
Not surprisingly, the targets of Roosevelt's ire declined his advice
and took their seats at the Republican National Convention in Chicago in June 1912, where Taft received a majority of delegates even
2 41
though Roosevelt was the clear winner among the popular vote.
In the end, the November general election was a debacle for the
Republicans. In August, Roosevelt and the progressives formally
237.
238.

See 62 CONG. REc., pt. 2, 2196 (1912).
See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 771.

239.

Id.

240.
241.

Must Win Anyhow, is Roosevelt's Cry, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1912, at 2.
See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 797, 809; MOWRY, supra note 108, at 235-36,

252-53.
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broke from the GOP and campaigned under the banner of the Bull
Moose ticket, allowing the Democrat Governor of New Jersey,
Woodrow Wilson, to win the presidency by a wide margin, with
Roosevelt a distant second, and Taft a dismal third, garnering only
24 2
the eight electoral votes of Utah and Vermont.
But at the moment immediately following his convention victory, Taft was guardedly optimistic. Men like Koenig, Parsons, and
Griscom had exercised all possible influence over their fellow
Republicans to secure his renomination, and Taft was deeply grateful. The President expressed as much in a letter one week after the
convention to yet another political ally, Judge Julius Mayer of the
Southern District of New York:
Mr. [Charles] Hilles [Taft's personal secretary] has
handed me your letter to him in which you are good
enough to send me congratulations and good wishes. I
write myself to thank you heartily for what you say. I quite
agree with you that the contest before the election must
be a spirited one, but I believe we can win. Whether we
win or lose in November, the victory at Chicago is no less
important, and I am very happy that the dangers which
threatened the party and the people have been
243
avoided.
There is no way of knowing how important Mayer's appointment
was to solidifying the active support of the local political establishment. But I think it is reasonable to infer that the vacancy on the
Southern District was at least indirectly involved in the events of the
1912 primary campaign in New York. Furthermore, while Mayer's
status as a GOP loyalist weighed heavily in favor of his nomination, I
do not believe that currying political support was Taft's sole (or
even dominant) motivation. Placing Mayer's appointment in the
proper context, and thus demonstrating why it is highly unlikely the
1912 seat was first offered to Cardozo, is the focus of the next
subsection.

242.
243.

See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 840.
Letter from President William H. Taft to Hon. Julius M. Mayer (Jun. 29, 1912).
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Understanding Mayer's Selection

One of Taft's biographers has written that the President "may
have weighed conservatism too heavily in his judicial appointments," but that "he did not allow the stain of political expediency
to discolor any that he made.

' 244

At first blush, asserting that

Mayer's nomination was, even in part, an act of political patronage
directed at influential New York Republicans - as I believe it was may seem to contradict Taft's avowed insistence that he would
make only merit-based appointments. 245 Closer examination, however, reveals that Mayer's selection should not be interpreted as a
departure from Taft's commitment to a competent judiciary. Indeed, it would have been utterly illogical, under the circumstances,
for Taft to offer the 1912 seat to Cardozo first.
First, and most important, by any objective measure Mayer was
well prepared to serve as a federaljudge. By 1912, he had enjoyed
over fifteen years of success as a private practitioner. 246 He had
been counsel to two municipal agencies. 24 7 Mayer even had some
prior judicial experience, and his brief time on the city bench was
lauded by the executive who appointed him. 248 He had served one

term as state Attorney General, and although five Justices voted
against his proffered interpretation of New York's police power in
Lochner,249 Mayer won all of the other cases he argued before the
United States Supreme Court, including a victory in the highly publicized Franchise Tax Cases, upholding the state's authority to levy
hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes upon public utilities.

250

244. 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 536.
245.
See supra text accompanying § III.A.1.
246.
See supra text accompanying note 79.
247. See supra text accompanying note 63.
248. See supra text accompanying note 64.
249.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see supra text accompanying
notes 66 to 67; see also infra note 250.
250. The series of opinions known as the Franchise Tax Cases begin at New York ex
rel. Metro. St. Ry. Co. v. New York, 199 U.S. 1 (1905). This consolidated decision involved multiple suits challenging New York's law permitting the taxation of public
franchises such as streetcar, water, heat, and electrical companies. An immense
amount of revenue was at stake for both government and industry, and General Mayer
triumphed over the finest opposing counsel in the state, among them Elihu Root. See
KENS, supra note 67, at 113-14.
The other cases in which Mayer appeared successfully before the Court were St.
John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633 (1906) (Mayer on brief); New York ex rel. New York C. &
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Second, while Mayer's Republican ties must have made him an
even more attractive candidate to Taft, he was not merely a partisan
hack. In fact, in the performance of his duties as New York Attorney General, Mayer had demonstrated a rather tin ear politically,
and was prone to making principled decisions in spite of the negative repercussions. For example, William Randolph Hearst was no
friend of the GOP, but Mayer's denial of Hearst's petition for a quo
warranto suit actually was preserving the mayoralty of a Tammany
Democrat, not a member of his own party. 2 51 This move garnered
the praise of the New York Times,2 52 but some of Mayer's supporters

believe he may have sacrificed his post as Attorney General by rendering a legally correct, but politically unwise ruling against
Hearst. 253

Even Florence Kelley's fervent opposition to Mayer's

H.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 548 (1906) (Mayer argued); and New York ex rel. Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907) (Mayer argued).
Finally, one scholar who has studied closely Mayer's argument in Lochner is critical
of his "somewhat halfhearted effort," in particular the "abbreviated written argument"
that was the state's brief. KENS, supra note 67 at 112, 113. Kens criticizes Mayer for
failing to include scientific or quantitative evidence as to the adverse health effects of
the baking occupation or argue that a state's police power could extend beyond laws
strictly classified as promoting public health, safety or welfare. Kens speculates that
Mayer, a conservative Republican, may have been philosophically opposed to the
Bakeshop Act, and thus offered a less-than-enthusiastic defense. But Kens also notes
that Lochner's appeal had been filed before Mayer had taken office as Attorney General, and his predecessor had consented to moving up the date of the oral argument
even though the important Franchise Tax Cases were set for argument only weeks later.
See id. at 107-14. According to this more benign explanation, "[o]ral argument in the
Lochner case was scheduled for February 23[, 1905], and the Franchise Tax Cases, which
were argued on April 17[, 1905], had originally been scheduled for oral argument even
earlier. Within five months from the time he took office, Mayer had to prepare and
argue two cases before the nation's highest court." Id. at 113-14.
251.
See supra text accompanying notes 72 to 78.
252. See supra text accompanying note 75.
253. See Letter from Foster to Taft, supra note 75 ("The only public criticism upon
[Mayer's] whole career that I have ever heard mentioned was his refusal to authorize
the institution of an action of quo warranto, on the part of Hearst, to oust Mayor McClellan from his office. That may or may not have been a mistake of politicaljudgment. It
undoubtedly cost him some votes when he ran for Attorney-General and was the subject
of attacks made upon him by the Hearst newspapers. That fact, however, does not, in
my opinion, affect his judicial qualifications since the expediency of beginning such an
action most people would concede to have been of doubtful question."); Letter from
Low to Taft, supra note 64 (noting of Mayer's decision in the Hearst matter, " [t]
his was
evidently good law, and the ultimate outcome of the re-count justified it as a sound
conclusion. I have never been quite sure that it was good political sense; for it was
worth a good deal to the State to have all doubt promptly removed in regard to the
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nomination 254 may have validated his judicial integrity in Taft's
eyes. Kelley was specifically critical of an advisory opinion Mayer
had issued in 1905, holding a New York law prohibiting the employment of children in factories did not apply to those working in
open farming sheds that may be connected to or under the management of factories. 25 5 The former New York Commissioner of
Labor who had requested the opinion assured Taft that "Mr.
Mayer's opinion was a reasonable construction of [the] statute,"
and grumbled that "this particular criticism is a manifestation of
the disordered temper of the times, which would hold everyjudicial
officer culpable for not construing the law to be what the critic believes the law should be." 256 Taft and Wickersham especially could
appreciate this sentiment, as they too felt they were under siege
from impulsive progressives who believed the plain meaning of the
25 7
law should pose no impediment to their desired reforms.
In a letter to Taft, Judge Hiscock of the New York Court of
Appeals qualified Mayer's GOP credentials in the context of his legal acumen: "I scarcely knew Mr. Mayer when he was elected Attorney General and at that time I thought that perhaps his nomination
might rest more on political considerations than on his ability and
election. I do not recall having heard Mr. Mayer criticized for any other official act
when Attorney-General.").

254.
See supra text accompanying notes 80 to 81.
255. See Letter from Sherman to Wickersham, supra note 83.
256. Id.
257. In a speech at Princeton University in May 1911, Wickersham railed against
"[i]mpatient reformers, desirous of securing the prestige of immediate success in the
advocacy of their nostrums, [who] chafe at delays." The Attorney General exhorted the
students to "carefully examine existing laws and institutions before lending your aid to
their overthrow." GEORGE W. WIcKERSHAM, THE CHANGING ORDER 35 (1914).
There may have been an additional reason for Taft and Wickersham to relish Kelley's criticism of Mayer. She was the General Secretary of the National Consumer's
Union, which had won a number of high-profile decisions with Louis Brandeis as coun-

sel, most notably Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which the famous "Brandeis
brief" was first utilized. For years afterwards Taft and Wickersham remained incensed
by Brandeis's conduct as Glavis's counsel in the Ballinger-Pinchot congressional hearings. See supra note 209. In particular, they felt was it "sophistry" for Brandeis "to put
an immoral construction" upon Wickersham's predating the report that Taft stated he
relied upon in exculpating Ballinger, an entirely innocuous action in their view. 1 PRINGLE, supra note 107, at 513. Thus, beyond mere disagreement with Kelley's progressivism, Taft and Wickersham had personal reasons to resent her organization and its
leadership.
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acquirements as a lawyer." 258 But "[i]t was not long before I entirely re-cast my opinion. In the discharge of his duties as Attorney
General Mr. Mayer steadily and largely grew in my estimate as I
think he did in the estimate of people generally who had not before
known much of him." 259 In other words, that Mayer was a talented

politician did not mean he was not also a skilled jurist. Both qualities were essential, for as much as Taft may have craved partisan
support for his reelection bid, he refused to appoint an unqualified
candidate, regardless of the political consequences. At the exact
same time Mayer was under consideration, December 1911, Taft
rejected two men proposed for the federal bench by Walter Brown,
a Republican National Committeeman from Ohio (Taft's home
state), even though Brown would retaliate by publicly endorsing
Roosevelt for the GOP nomination in 1912. Taft told Major Butt
that "Brown had two candidates; one was an ignorant lawyer and
the other was merely a creature of Brown - which unfitted him for
the Bench." 260 The President obviously wanted to be renominated,

but his self-interest was not without limits. Mayer's Republican
background undoubtedly augmented his stellar legal resume, but
would not have served as the primary impetus for his nomination.
My interpretation of Mayer's appointment involves, I recognize, a good deal of speculation about a relatively low-profile presidential action. Nevertheless, my theory mirrors the conventional
wisdom attributed to an event about which far more is known, the
nomination of Mahlon Pitney, Taft's sixth and final Supreme Court
appointment. Granted, the naming of a Justice "is always an event
in the life of the nation," unaffected to the same degree by the political or parochial concerns endemic to district court nominations. 26 1 But the Pitney and Mayer selections share at least one
identical trait: timing. Judge Adams of the Southern District died
on October 9, 1911,262 and the first Justice John Marshall Harlan
258. Letter from Hiscock to Taft, supra note 185.
259. Id.
260. 2 BuTr, supra note 213, at 784.
261.
See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 30; cf. also Friedman, supra note 117, at 83
("Supreme Court seats continue.., to be perceived as national offices, over which no
state or region can claim a particular interest; in contrast to the nomination of district
court judges.").
262. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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died on October 14, 1911.263 Mayer and Pitney both were formally
nominated by Taft as their respective replacements on February 19,
1912.264 In addition, the contemporary understanding of Pitney's
elevation demonstrates the extent to which all of Taft's actions at
this moment in his presidency - even judicial appointments - were

influenced by the threat posed by Roosevelt.
In the fall of 1911, Pitney, like Mayer, had a distinguished record as a private practitioner, public official, and party luminary.
Following a dozen years as an attorney in NewJersey, Pitney in 1894
was elected a Republican member of Congress. After two terms in
Washington, he next was elected to the New Jersey State Senate,
becoming Republican floor leader and then president of that
chamber. In 1901, Pitney was appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, where he served until 1908, when he was named State
Chancellor. 265 Scholars who have studied Pitney's nomination are
unable to determine exactly how Taft came to consider the New
Jersey judge for the Supreme Court. 2 66 What is clear, however, is
that potential opposition from Roosevelt and his progressive supporters was a factor in Taft's decisionmaking process. 267 Taft declined to nominate his first choice for the vacancy, Judge William C.
Hook of the Eighth Circuit, when it became clear that Hook's prior
263. See ABRAHAM, supra note 122, at 130.
264. See the biographies of Pitney and Mayer in the Federal Judges Biographical
Database, at http://air.c.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/fjc bio. The concurrence of both
appointments is further reflected in a mix up of their paperwork. There is a note in
Mayer's file, dated February 23, 1912, from the Department of Justice, Office of the
Appointment Clerk directing: "[s]ee note of Feb. 19/12 from Sec'y [Charles] Hilles
[Taft's personal secretary] directing nomination of Julius M. Mayer as Judge, N.Y.S.,
filed in papers of Mahlon Pitney for Judge, Supreme Court."
265. See VII DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 642 (Pt. 2 1934).
266. See Alexander M. Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible
Government 1910-21, in 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 326-27 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds.,
1984).
267. See ABRAHAM, supra note 122, at 131 ("[Ilmportant in Taft's mind as well as
those of his political strategists was that New Jersey could become a battleground between Taft's supporters and those of Theodore Roosevelt, whose return presidential
candidacy was now clearly emerging."); Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 266, at 320
(describing the political atmosphere at the time of Pitney's nomination: "Insurgents
were more insurgent now. Everyone all around was a bit bolder, a bit more ruthless.
Taft for his part was more beleaguered (and hence, perhaps more cautious about offending) and more completely alienated from Progressive opinion (and hence, perhaps, also more inclined to be more aggressive).").
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opinions involving race and labor would provoke too divisive a confirmation battle. 268 But the progressives were geared up for a fight,
and whether Taft was unaware, unconcerned, or possibly even encouraged by Pitney's own conservative views on labor, his nomination was soon met with staunch opposition. 269 Pitney ultimately was
approved by a Senate vote of fifty to twenty-six, with only five
progressives voting nay, but this was one of the closest confirmation
votes in years, and the "controversy over the Pitney nomination was
aberrational for its time." 270

The newspapers reported that Taft

could expect political dividends by appointing Pitney, but "no one
doubted that Pitney had been selected on merit after careful
consideration."271

History does not remember Pitney as a great Justice, but he
served ten years on the Court in a capable and workmanlike manner.272 Mayer's legacy as a jurist would be quite similar. In fact,
Mayer's performance would be considered commendable, but not
spectacular, by his colleague on the Southern District, Learned
Hand. "At the outset," Hand was "doubtful" about Mayer, but he
"slowly rose in Hand's estimation" because "he took his job seriously and could produce better-than-adequate opinions." 2 73 Mayer
proved to be a "conscientious, competent judge, especially strong
in patent and receivership cases." 274 "Hand's relations with Mayer,
distant at first, had grown warmer," and in 1921, Hand supported
Mayer's elevation to the Second Circuit, in large measure because
Hand understood that he was out of the running himself and that
Mayer offered a superior alternative to the competition. 2 75 (Incidentally, three years later, when Mayer resigned from the Court of
Appeals, he returned the favor. Hand was the clear favorite for the
seat, but "Mayer was too experienced in politics . . . to leave the
268.
269.

See Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 266, at 318-24.
See Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 266, at 328-32; Fred L. Israel, Mahlon Pitney,

in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 2001, 2003-004 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).

270.
271.
at 505.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Friedman, supra note 117, at 72-73.
Bickel & Schmidt, supra note 266, at 329. See also McHargue, supra note 115,
See Israel, supra note 269, at 2009.
GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 144.
Id. at 271.
Id.
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outcome to chance. He resorted to his wide range of contacts ...to

ensure Hand's promotion."' 276) The point is that when Taft nominated Mayer and Pitney, he was selecting well-qualified individuals
from whom he expected, and received, a respectable performance.
The fact that both were also prominent Republicans would have
operated in their favor, but would not have sufficed to persuade
Taft were they otherwise unqualified.
Mayer's nomination, so understood, makes it highly improbable that Taft would have offered the 1912 seat to Cardozo before
Mayer. First, the timing of the correspondence between Taft, Wickersham, and Mayer's supporters leaves extremely little time to first
approach Cardozo. By the first week of December 1911, there is no
doubt that Taft personally was aware that Mayer was the favored
choice of the New York GOP establishment. 27 7 Also in early December, Taft was writing to these same Republicans that he would
consider Adams's replacement over the upcoming holidays. 27 8 And
although "only" a district court judgeship, Taft had taken enough
of an interest in the vacancy to make personal inquiries into
Mayer's fitness for the seat, independent of the vetting efforts of
Wickersham. 279 To assume that Mayer was offered the post only
after Cardozo turned it down would mean that between the time
Taft informed his influential Republican allies (men whose support
he desperately needed in the coming months) that he would consider their proffered candidate (into whose past Taft was personally
checking), and the time the offer was made to Mayer, the President
authorized Wickersham to first present the opportunity to Cardozo.
276. Id. at 275.
277. See Letter from Griscom to Wickersham, supra note 196 ("I was in Washington
on private business the beginning of this week [December 8, 1911] and while there I
learned for the first time from the President that Mr. Koenig had recommended the
Hon. Julius M. Mayer for the appointment to the District Court.").
278. See Letter from Taft to Griscom, supra note 227; Letter from Taft to Parsons,
supra note 228.
279.
See Letter from Attorney General George W. Wickersham to Chief Judge Edgar M. Cullen, New York Court of Appeals (Jan. 13, 1912) (requesting Cullen's "opinion concerning Judge Mayer's qualifications"); Letter from Cullen to Wickersham,
supra note 186 (replying that "I have already received and answered a letter from the
President" on the matter); Letter from Wickersham to Cullen (Jan. 18, 1912) (responding that "I was not aware that the President had already written you. The letter must
have been kept in his personal files, as it was not among the letters sent to me by his
secretary.").
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Not only is this a series of events unlikely in theory, there is not the
slightest indicia of any evidence supporting such a hypothesis, in
28 0
contrast to the paper trail detailing Mayer's nomination.
Second, considering Cardozo's later greatness, as opposed to
Mayer's later obscurity, it is instinctively temptiig to assume that
Taft and Wickersham would have preferred Cardozo, and the political consequences be damned. But one must remember the respective status of both men in late 1911. Cardozo was a successful
practitioner, probably the most distinguished appellate lawyer in
the state. 28 1 Beyond this, however, there was little else to recommend about him. Cardozo had held no public office, judicial or
otherwise, and to the minimal extent he was politically active, it was
as a Democrat. On the other hand, Mayer was himself an accomplished lawyer, and also well regarded within the New York Court of
Appeals, as evidenced by the letters from the four members of that
bench who wrote Taft in support of Mayer's capabilities. 28 2 But
Mayer additionally offered an established record as an appointed
and elected official, not to mention the promise of valuable political goodwill that would accompany his selection. Faced with a hypothetical choice between two well-qualified candidates, Cardozo
and Mayer would have been attractive for dissimilar reasons. In the
midst of a fierce primary challenge to his presidency, if Taft could
nominate an exceptional candidate and in the process appease his
political allies, or nominate an exceptional candidate and in the
280. Granted, nor is there is any documentation of an offer being made to Cardozo
in 1909, when I believe it occurred. My best guess is that either of two explanations is
possible. First, candidates for the 1909 seat were being considered in March and April
of that year, which was the first and second month of the nascent Taft administration.
The extended correspondence between Taft and Wickersham and local political and
legal advisers may not have begun until after the administration was a bit more settled.
A second, alternative possibility is that letters were written on Cardozo's behalf in 1909,
but were placed in the files of Hand, the nominee who ultimately received the appointment. If so, we probably will never see them because, despite repeated attempts by
Gunther to find the Department ofJustice files on Hand's nomination, it appears the
materials have been lost. See supra note 181. If any such letters existed among either
Cardozo's papers or the collections of documents involving his life, we can be confident
Kaufman would have found them. Cf Kaye, supra note 6, at 1029 ("There is not, there
will never be, a more comprehensive portrait of Cardozo. Professor Kaufman has read
everything by and about his subject ....").
281.
282.

See supra text accompanying note 87.
See supra notes 183, 185, 186.
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process spurn them, it seems neither irrational nor ignoble that
Taft would opt for the former. Precisely because Mayer so much
more ideally fit Taft's needs at this time than did Cardozo, I believe
we can confidently assume that Mayer was the administration's first
and only choice, and that no offer was made to Cardozo in 1912.
IV.

LoOSE ENDS

Even if I am correct in arguing that the offer to Cardozo was
made in 1909 and not 1912, two significant questions remain unanswered. First, how does one account for Hand's recollection that
he also approached Cardozo about joining the Southern District?
Second, why has this story never been told; i.e., why did none of the
persons involved ever discuss both 1909 offers in the context of the
same nomination? This Part addresses each of these issues.

A.

Did Hand Bring a Second Offer?

Judge Hand told two of Cardozo's biographers that he had
once spoken with Cardozo about joining the federal bench, who
demurred on the ground that it paid too little. In 1957, Hand told
Kaufman that he:
also recalled having asked Cardozo whether he would
take a federal district judgeship and having been turned
down the same way [due to salary concerns]. He could
remember only that the date was prior to 1913 [when Cardozo was elected to the New York Supreme Court], and
hence this may well have been the same offer referred to
283
by Burlingham.
The latter portion of this statement, that Hand and Burlingham
discussed the same offer with Cardozo, is unlikely. According to
Friedman, "[i]t seems probable that Hand would make this approach only when he was already on the court - and that would
mean that it concerned a subsequent vacancy." 28 4 I agree. If Hand
were speaking of the same offer referred to by Burlingham, he essentially would have been querying Cardozo about a seat on the
Southern District before he himself was a judge. Not only does
common sense counsel against such a scenario, but so do Hand's
283.

284.

supra note 4, at 608 n.23.
Friedman, supra note 15, at 1747 n.41.
KAUFMAN,
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words from a different interview. A 1940 biography of Cardozo by
George Hellman includes the same anecdote, but with slightly
more detail:
Judge Learned Hand relates an incident which indicates
the early age at which Cardozo was appreciated byjudges.
While he was still at the bar a vacancy occurred in the
United States District Court. Cardozo was leaving the
courthouse as Hand ran after him and asked him whether
he would consider taking a position in the court. The salary was then only $6,000 and Cardozo, after reflection,
285
declined it.

Hellman's version bolsters the likelihood that Hand was already on
the bench when he spoke with Cardozo, raising the possibility that
Hand brought a second offer from the Taft administration. Indeed, Hand did have both reason and opportunity to do so. His
Southern District colleague George Adams died in October 1911,
almost two and a half years after Hand's appointment, but Adams
had been seriously ill for quite some time. 28 6 Before another vacancy on the Southern District would arise in 1914, Cardozo would
28 7
be nominated and elected to the New York Supreme Court,
meaning Hand may have contacted Cardozo about the Adams seat
that Mayer received in February 1912.
That Hand also approached Cardozo about joining the Southern District allows for a few hypotheses. The first is that Hand
brought a second offer from the Taft administration. Kaufman is at
least open to this possibility, having written that, at the time of his
appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, "Cardozo had already
been sounded out by President Taft at least once and perhaps twice
with respect to appointment as a federal districtjudge in the Southern District of New York." 2 88 The second explanation is advanced
285.

HELLMAN,

supra note 158, at 44.

286. Adams was appointed to the Southern District in 1901. See 109 F. v (1901).
According to Gunther, Adams's illness left him largely unable to serve within a year and
a half following his appointment; i.e., sometime in 1903. See GUNrHER, supra note 5, at
143. Adams's obituary in the New York Times, however, states that he had been sick for
approximately two years before his death, see supra note 198, which would be October
1909, or about five months after Hand joined the Southern District.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 87 to 105.
288. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 23 n.2.
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by Friedman: Hand's efforts are further proof that the offer to Cardozo from Wickersham and Burlingham was actually for the 1912
vacancy. 289 My take on the matter is that neither Kaufman nor

Friedman is fully correct, and I offer a third hypothesis. I believe
that Hand's conversation was in late 1911 or early 1912, regarding
the Adams vacancy, and entirely unrelated to the earlier 1909 offer.
But, unlike Kaufman, I think Hand acted on his own initiative, and
not as an authorized emissary of the Taft administration. And, unlike Friedman, I do not think the fact that Hand independently
gauged Cardozo's interest in the Southern District at a later date
weakens the argument that Burlingham also tendered a formal offer at the behest of the Taft administration in 1909.
There are two reasons why Hand would not have been acting
as a representative of Taft and Wickersham when he spoke with
Cardozo. First, Hand probably did not approach Cardozo before
Adams had passed away. Adams's sickness left him essentially absent almost from the time Hand began his own service on the
Southern District. But I believe it is reasonable to infer that Hand
would have felt it highly inappropriate to approach Cardozo about
replacing Adams while his ill colleague still was alive and officially
an active judge. And even assuming Hand saw nothing improper
about such an overture, he did not appear to be particularly troubled by Adams's inability to shoulder his share of the Southern District's docket. At the time he went on the bench, " [c] ourt demands
kept a young energetic judge such as Hand busy enough, but his
official duties did not prove unduly burdensome." 290 So manageable did Hand find his workload that he opposed plans to create
more judgeships on the Southern District. Hand "knew that a visiting judge from another district could always be brought in when
the caseload became heavy, and he saw no need to add additional
permanent seats before World War I."291
The second reason that Hand almost certainly was recruiting
without official permission was his status as an adviser to Roosevelt's
presidential campaign. Hand was a "true believer" in the "progres289.
290.

See supra text accompanying note 156.
GuNTHER, supra note 5, at 144.

291.

Id.
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sive cause."29 2 Hand and Roosevelt first met in 1898 when the former was a young Albany lawyer and the latter was the governor of
New York. 29 3 The two had not been particularly close, but in late
1909, Hand was so enthused by The Promise of American Life, a new
book by his good friend and progressive intellectual Herbert Croly,
that he sent a copy to Roosevelt, recently departed from the White
House and traveling overseas. Roosevelt was quite grateful, and
Croly's ideas provided a partial blueprint for Roosevelt's progressivism in the ensuing campaign. 294 Roosevelt's pitched battles with
the conservative wing of the New York GOP in the disastrous 1910
midterm elections left him dejected and Hand disillusioned. But as
Roosevelt reemerged in 1911 as the national voice of progressive
interests, Hand became an active supporter. 29 5 "During that year,
Hand visited Roosevelt a number of times in Oyster Bay and carried
on a substantial correspondence with him," and "[b]y the end of
February 1912, when Roosevelt publicly threw his hat into the ring,
Hand had gotten to know him more intimately and, despite some
continued misgivings, had moved clearly to his side." 29 6 During
these months, from his position inside the campaign, Hand was at
least marginally successful in shaping Roosevelt's thinking on antitrust and due process issues but, despite his repeated attempts,
Hand could not dissuade Roosevelt from advocating the popular
recall of judicial decisions, a politically calamitous move. 29 7 Later,
after Mayer had been confirmed, Hand remained active in
Roosevelt's campaign. He participated in the progressives' official
break from the Republican party, helped author Roosevelt's platform for the Bull Moose convention, joined the local and national
298
chapters of the new party, and even donated money.
Hand's conduct was extraordinary in the sense that his efforts
were undertaken while a sitting federal judge, and against the incumbent President who had put him on the bench earlier that
term. As Burlingham wrote years later, if Taft "could have foreseen
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 190.
See id. at 64.
See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 192-202.
See id. at 202-06.
Id. at 206.
See id. at 206-20.
See id. at 226-31.
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that in less than three years Hand would be supporting Theodore
Roosevelt as the Bull Moose candidate for the Presidency . . .he

would not have considered Hand for a moment."299 It is unknown
to what extent Taft at the time knew of Hand's extrajudicial activities against him, but Hand himself was uneasy about the ethical and
career implications of his politicking.3 0 0 Whenever it was that Taft
did become aware, he was none too pleased. Taft "never forgot or
forgave Hand's association with the Bull Moose movement and repeatedly managed to block consideration of Hand for the Supreme
Court during the Republican administrations of the 1920s."' 01
When Justice Pitney retired in 1922, Chief Justice Taft wrote President Harding that Hand had "turned out to be a wild Roosevelt
man and a Progressive, and though on the Bench, he went into the
campaign . . . I think it would be risking too much to appoint

him." 30 2 Hand remained unapologetic, stating near the end of his
life that in the showdown between Taft and Roosevelt he "was indeed an ardent 'Rooseveltian.' . . . I have never repented and

should do it again." 30 3 Still, he acknowledged that his progressive
activism was noted by the powers-that-be, and had left him "without
30 4
a party" and "alone on a life raft" in troubled political waters.
Even if Taft personally did not know of Hand's assistance to
Roosevelt until after the 1912 campaign, it seems quite likely that
the news would have gotten back to and infuriated Wickersham, a
longtime veteran of New York politics who was intensely loyal to the
President. According to Major Butt, Wickersham would "literally
grow[ ] frenzied when he talks of Roosevelt ...almost speechless
with rage."30 5 By late 1911, the Taft administration was circling its
wagons within the Republican party generally and in New York specifically. After Adams died and there was a vacancy on the Southern District, I believe that Hand would have been persona non
grata in Wickersham's eyes, and not among those trusted enough to
deliver offers to potential judicial nominees. In other words, when
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Burlingham, supra note 135, at 330.
See GuNTHER, supra note 5, at 231.
GuNrHER, supra note 5, at 239.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 276.
2 Burr, supra note 213, at 538.
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Hand approached Cardozo about joining the Southern District, I
posit that he did so out of his own self-interest in securing quality
judges for his bench, but without any authority to actually deliver
an offer.
Furthermore, I disagree with Friedman that the timing of
Hand's discussion with Cardozo makes it more likely that the offer
delivered by Burlingham was for the same seat. Most importantly,
the Burlingham and Hand anecdotes are distinct in a couple of material respects. Burlingham indicates that: one, he approached Cardozo with a specific offer; and two, he did so at the direction of the
Attorney General. 30 6 By contrast, in neither the Kaufman nor
Hellman version does Hand say that he actually tendered an offer,
much less that he did so upon request from Wickersham. 30 7 This
latter point is crucial, because Wickersham, like Hand, probably
would have been reluctant to seek out Adams's replacement while
the judge was still alive and struggling with his illness. If it would
have been inappropriate for Hand to informally sound out prospective candidates, it would have been doubly so for the Attorney General to tender an official offer through an intermediary. This is
especially true in light of the fact that Burlingham believes that he
did not know Cardozo before approaching him about the Southern
District. 30 8 It stands to reason that Wickersham would not have dispatched Burlingham to make an offer to someone with whom he
was unfamiliar for ajudgeship that was presently occupied, albeit by
an ailing judge. Even professional politicians like Koenig, ever eager to exploit a patronage opportunity, waited until after Adams
had died to begin lobbying for Mayer. By the time that occurred,
extenuating political circumstances would have lifted Mayer's stock
considerably higher than Cardozo's. Hand, the political maverick,
may have deemed Cardozo ideally suited for the Southern District
in early 1912, but that does not alter the likelihood that Taft and
Wickersham would have found Cardozo less appealing than Mayer.
In sum, I believe that when Hand approached Cardozo about joining the Southern District, Cardozo was having this conversation for
the second time, and providing the same justification to the very
306.
307.
308.

See supra text accompanying notes 162 to 163.
See supra text accompanying notes 283, 285.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
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man who had benefited most from his first refusal less than three
years earlier.
B.

An Inexplicable Silence

Possibly the most curious aspect of the story of Cardozo, Hand,
and the Southern District is that it has never been told in detail.
One cannot help but wonder why none of the five principals - Taft,
Wickersham, Burlingham, Cardozo, and Hand - ever told the full
story of the 1909 nomination, and explained the Cardozo declination and Hand acceptance as a single anecdote. All were blessed
with long lives, some extraordinarily so. Taft died in 1930 at age
seventy-two, Wickersham in 1936 at seventy-seven, Cardozo in 1938
at sixty-eight, Burlingham in 1959 at one hundred, and Hand in
1961 at eighty-nine.3 0 9 Certainly the easiest, but also weakest explanation is that none wanted Hand to know that he was the administration's second choice in 1909. If so, no one was around long
enough to talk, as Hand outlived them all. While obviously possible, such a scenario hardly seems plausible. Decades before Hand's
death in his fifty-second year on the bench, his stellar reputation
was more than secure. Instead, a variety of coincidences, idiosyncratic private motivations, or maybe a combination of both, must
explain why this story has never surfaced. The following represents
my best guess as to why each of the five men involved remained
silent.
Taft either may not have realized or not cared that Cardozo
and Hand were offered the same seat on the Southern District. He
310
appointed over fifty judges during his four years as President,
and presumably countless other prospects declined. But considering the extent to which Taft took personal pride in his handpicked
federal judiciary, as well as his extensive involvement in the selection of each judge, one may assume he at least would have been
cognizant of the Cardozo-Hand connection. Furthermore, Taft did
have the opportunity to reflect upon the merit of both men relative
to one another. In the same 1922 letter in which Chief Justice Taft
309. See 2 PRINGLE, supra note 111, at 1079 (Taft); DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 713 (Wickersham); KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 578 (Cardozo);
DICTiONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 87 (Burlingham); GUNTHER,
supra note 5, at 679 (Hand).
310. See supra text accompanying note 117.
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discouraged President Harding from appointing Hand to the
Pitney vacancy on the Supreme Court,3 1 I he concurrently offered a
more favorable view of Cardozo as "the best judge in New York ....
[He] is a Jew and a Democrat. I don't think he would always side

3
with Brandeis, but he is what they call a progressive judge."

12

Taft's disdain for Hand and his support of Roosevelt in 1912 eventually subsided enough for the Chief Justice to support Hand's elevation to Second Circuit in 1924 on the ground that he was "the
best man" for the post.3 13 It may have been, however, that Taft himself not a "progressive judge" as he perceived Cardozo and
Hand to be - did not consider either man a particularly "great"
judge. Also, when Taft died in 1930, both Cardozo and Hand were
already extremely well respected, but their reputations had not yet
reached the stratospheric levels of later years. Cardozo was still two
years from being nominated to the Supreme Court and Hand had
another three decades on the Second Circuit to burnish his legacy.
In other words, Taft never may have said anything about the Cardozo-Hand nomination because he did not consider it to be all that
noteworthy.
Much of the same is true for Wickersham. Like Taft, he too
was involved in so many nominations that it may never have occurred to him that the relatively unknown lawyers to whom he offered a seat on the Southern District in 1909 were the same men
who years later were considered among the finest judges in the
country. Again, while possible, this seems farfetched. Unlike Taft,
Wickersham spent a good deal of time with both Cardozo and
Hand later in life, and was plenty impressed with their talents.
When the American Law Institute was founded in 1923, Wickersham and Cardozo were named president and vice president, respectively.3 14 In 1932, following Cardozo's appointment to the
Supreme Court, Wickersham wrote President Hoover: "I don't
think you could possibly have made a better selection for the Supreme Court than Judge Cardozo. ''3 15 Wickersham, although not
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See supra text accompanying note 302.
Murphy, supra note 125, at 178.
Id. at 179 n.85.
See POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 89.
Id. at 169.
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known as a particularly genial man, 31 6 was similarly generous in his
praise of Hand. Following Hand's appointment to the Southern
District in 1909, his relationship with Wickersham "had been respectful but not close," presumably due in part to Hand's support
for Roosevelt in 1912.3 1 7 But in May 1934, Wickersham wrote Hand

to congratulate him on his twenty-fifth anniversary as a federal
judge: "I am glad I had a part in putting you there... I wish I could
be as proud of everything I did in official life as I am of that act.
You have made a distinguished record." 318 In 1935, Wickersham
helped secure Hand's nomination to be a vice president of the
ALI. 31 9 Wickersham died the next year, apparently having never
commented on whether Cardozo's invitation to join the Southern
District was extended in 1909 or 1912.320

Cardozo himself must have realized that Hand was the beneficiary of his actions in 1909. But while it is less than obvious why
Taft and Wickersham would not have publicized this fact, there is
an entirely reasonable explanation why Cardozo would have remained silent, one that requires understanding Cardozo and
Hand's personalities, as well as the relationship between the two
men. Those who knew Cardozo almost universally describe him as
a "saint."32' According to one of his law clerks, "Cardozo had a
saintly quality to him in that he didn't like to hurt people and was
very gentle and considerate.

'32 2

His "personal style was concilia-

316.
See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 715 ("Often described as having a 'peppery temperament,' [Wickersham] was blunt in expressing his
views, sometimes to the point of tactlessness.").
317. GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 414.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. Wickersham never published his memoirs, and his papers, with the exception
of those preserved in the Taft archives, have not been made available for review at the
request of his family. See DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 52, at 715.
321.
See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 183; POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 1; POSNER,
supra note 1, at 7-9.
322. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 482 (quoting Ambrose Doskow). Cardozo had four
law clerks during his six years on the United States Supreme Court, and each remembers him in terms of his saintliness. In addition to Doskow, Mel Siegel noted that Cardozo, "[l]ooked like a saint, acted like a saint, and really was a saint." Joe Rauh
concurred that "at the time I thought he was a saint, and came as close to being a saint
as I would ever in my lifetime meet." Cardozo's fourth clerk, Alan Stroock disagreed,
believing that Cardozo was "[n]ot at all" a saint, but rather "a very vain and in some
ways intolerant man." Nevertheless, even Stroock recalled that Cardozo was a "gracious
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tory, not adversarial," and "[h] is gentleness, integrity, and generous
nature are legendary."' 323

Moreover, Cardozo's graciousness to

others was reinforced by an intense desire that his own privacy be
maintained.3 2 4 So closely did he safeguard the details of his personal life that he destroyed many of his papers upon his move to
Washington in 1932,325 and instructed others to burn the rest upon
his death. 326 As for Hand, one of his most distinctive personality
traits was a deep skepticism of his legal talents, a remarkable denial
of his objective accomplishments. Gunther theorizes that Hand's
insecurity was forged in his youth. His father, a successful lawyer,
died when Learned was only fourteen, and for the remainder of his
life Hand struggled under the self-imposed misperception that he
lacked commensurate skill.3 27 "This doubt never wholly left Hand

during his fifty-two years on the federal bench," and even when
others celebrated his career, "the laudatory outpourings temporarily allayed his brooding lack of self-esteem, [but] Hand could
never quite escape this 'more authentic version' of himself, and he
continued to doubt that his achievements warranted the acclaim." 328 Nor was Hand's insecurity lost on others; Frankfurter re-

ferred to Hand as "the modern Hamlet," a judge "buffeted and
battered by the largest self-doubt of any human being I have ever
encountered."' 32 9 When the personal natures of Cardozo and Hand
are combined with a third factor, their friendship, it becomes unsurprising that Cardozo would keep to himself the details of the
1909 offer. By the end of his career, "there was no one on the [Supreme] Court for whom Cardozo felt as warm a friendship as he did
• . . human being. In both law and manners, he was the greatest teacher I have ever
known." Id. at 482-83. See also generally Recollections of FourCardozo Law Clerks, supra note
96.
323.

POLENBERG, supra note 96, at xi.

324. See KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 568 (stating that Cardozo was "exceedingly private"); POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 3 (recounting the eulogy of Judge Irving Lehman,
Cardozo's colleague on the New York Court of Appeals and closest friend: "A man of
fastidious reticence, he guarded jealously his personal privacy . .
325.

See KAUFMAN, supra note 21, at 1253.

326.

See POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 4-5.

327.

See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 5-17.
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for Learned Hand.13 3 0 But the two judges were not so intimate that

Hand was privy to all of Cardozo's secrets. Hand was aware that
Cardozo "never quite wanted anybody to penetrate into his inner
life," and felt that "very few have ever known what went on behind
those blue eyes. ''1 3 1 I believe that Cardozo, an immensely polite
and private man, aware of his friend's self-doubts, probably was exercising appropriate tact in his disinclination to reveal that in 1909
the preferences of the Taft administration ran from himself first to
Hand second.
Burlingham's silence is the most glaring of all, as he was personally involved in the offers to both Cardozo and Hand. Granted,
Burlingham did reveal the details of each occurrence, but he never
described them as anything more than separate, unrelated events. I
suppose one could argue that Burlingham also was protecting both
Hand's fragile ego and Cardozo's cherished privacy. Burlingham
clearly manifested a paternalistic instinct towards Hand, having
been, along with Frankfurter, Hand's most vocal proponent over
the years for a seat on Supreme Court.3 3 2 When that prize never
came, Burlingham bemoaned Hand's poor luck and bitterly
blamed those who failed to adequately fight for the appointment. 333 Maybe Burlingham felt publicizing the fact that Hand was

the backup choice to Cardozo in 1909 somehow further deprived
Hand of his deserved accolades. And while Cardozo may have ex330. See Alan Stroock, Recollections of Four Cardozo Law Clerks, supra note 96, at 22.
See also Letter from Gunther to Hessler, supra note 14 ("Hand of course was very fond
of Cardozo, especially in later years"). Cardozo's high regard for Hand was professional
as well as personal. "Asked to say who among his Supreme Court colleagues was the
greatest living American jurist, Justice Benjamin Cardozo replied, 'The greatest living
American jurist isn't on the Supreme Court."' GUNTHER, supra note 5, at ix (Foreword
by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
331.
POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 3; KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 483.
332. See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 554-70.
333. Burlingham recognized that "appointments to the Supreme Court were
largely a matter of fortune," determined primarily by geographic considerations. "One
of the most unlucky men has been in this regard, Learned Hand, one of the ablest
judges we have had in America." After Hand did not receive the nomination for a 1942
vacancy, Burlingham "blame[d] [Justice] Harlan F. Stone very much for it because
when [President] Roosevelt had a talk with Stone, he asked him what he thought of
Learned Hand, and he said he thought highly of him. And he asked what he thought
of [Wiley] Rutledge, and he said he was a fine fellow. If he had said Hand is infinitely
superior to Rutledge he might have carried the day." Burlingham COHP, supra note
39, at 22-23.
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perienced all of the successes for which Burlingham could wish,
that did not stop Burlingham's active participation in the fight to
shape Cardozo's posthumous reputation. Immediately after Cardozo's death in 1938, George Hellman, an author and Cardozo
family friend, set about compiling materials to write the Justice's
biography. Burlingham refused to cooperate in any form, citing
Cardozo's request that the story of his life not be written.3 34 When
the book appeared in print, Cardozo's former law clerk Joe Rauh
panned it in the pages of the Harvard Law Review:
The lawyer will find little in this book to satisfy his curiosity about Mr. Justice Cardozo, and the layman will find
only an artificial personality episodically portrayed. For
here is no biography in any proper sense of the word, but
simply a hastily compiled collection of anecdotes from the
Justice's life, interspersed with excerpts from his writings
and statements of others about him. What emerges is an
unreal and unrecognizable saint, for the human qualities
of the man, which constituted his true saintliness, are
lost.3 3 5

Another of Cardozo's biographers, Professor Richard Polenberg,
offers that the response of Rauh and Burlingham exhibited "a conviction that Cardozo's legacy was properly theirs to interpret, and
that Hellman was, in effect, poaching on their turf."33 6 In other
334. See POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 242-46. "Although Hellman received assistance from a great many people, there were a few notable holdouts," including Hand,
who "agreed to talk to Hellman but would not allow him access to any correspondence," and Burlingham, who "wanted nothing to do with the enterprise." Id. at 243.
335. Joseph Rauh, Jr., 53 HARV. L. REv. 1404, 1404 (1940) (book review).
336. POLENBERG, supra note 96, at 246. One of the prevalent criticisms of
Hellman's book is that as a nonlawyer he was ill-equipped to address Cardozo's life.
Polenberg notes that it was valid to "point[ I out that Hellman lacked scholarly credentials. But many years later, when Frankfurter learned that the distinguished constitutional scholar Alpheus Thomas Mason was thinking of writing a biography of Cardozo,
he again became bitterly resentful: not because Mason, author of the magisterial
HA.AN FisKa STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw (1956), was an intellectual lightweight but
because his reading of constitutional history was in important respects at variance with
Frankfurter's own." Id.
Frankfurter's displeasure with the prospect of a Mason biography of Cardozo led
the Justice to encourage his law clerk at the time, Andrew Kaufman, that he should
undertake a biography of Cardozo. See supra text accompanying note 21. But Kaufman
also has noted that "Frankfurter's habit of encouraging people to write particular books
is often remarked on quite critically in academic literature. The notion is that Frank-
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words, maybe Burlingham felt that sharing the Cardozo-Hand connection somehow clouded or misrepresented Cardozo's real
greatness.
Unfortunately, I believe that each of my suggested explanations is unpersuasive. First, the fact that Hand may have received
his appointment in 1909 only after Cardozo had declined an offer
for the same seat in no conceivable way diminishes Hand's reputation. Second, nor is there any good reason why Burlingham may
have felt the Cardozo-Hand anecdote reflected poorly upon Cardozo. Cardozo's stated reason for turning down a seat on the federal bench - the job did not pay enough - arguably may have been
3 37
somewhat less than noble, but it certainly was not illegitimate.
There is no evidence that Burlingham, himself a successful lawyer
who spent almost his entire career in lucrative private practice and
not public office, was unsympathetic to Cardozo's money concerns. 3 38 Finally, even assuming that Burlingham was motivated by
either of these improbable justifications, this would not explain why
he told the 1909 Cardozo story at all, as he later did to both Kaufman and the Columbia Oral History Project. Burlingham's Columbia interviews do reveal that he expected the material would not be

furter was trying to spread his own version of history. All I can say is that, as far as my
own book is concerned, he never once tried to sell me on a particular version of Cardozo or Cardozo's contribution to the law." Kaufman, supra note 21, at 1246-47.
Finally, Polenberg's explanation for Frankfurter's concerns about Cardozo's legacy
would not apply equally to Burlingham. Frankfurter himself noted that "C.C.B. was
broadly cultivated but not a scholar." Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 434. There is no
evidence that Burlingham was overly troubled that others may misinterpret Cardozo's
judicial efforts. Rather, C.C.B.'s interest would have been in the portrayal of Cardozo as
a person. See Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 11, 13 (stating that he and Cardozo
"became intimate friends and he was really one of the most lovely characters I've ever
known," but disclaiming that "I'm not capable of saying whether he had a [constitutional] philosophy which he could follow consistently.").
337. See supra note 44 (comparing the financial situations of Cardozo and Hand in
1909).
338. In fact, Taft once good-naturedly chastised Burlingham on the issue of wealth
and judicial candidates. In the days immediately prior to the nomination of Edward T.
Sanford to the Supreme Court, Burlingham wrote Chief Justice Taft a letter expressing
his disapproval of the nominee. Replied Taft: "If you people in New York were not so
eager for money and would be content to live on a reasonable salary... you might have
some representatives on our Bench, but you are all after the almighty dollar. Now put
that in your pipe and smoke it." Murphy, supra note 125, at 182.
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made public for many years, 339 but reading them one also gets the
sense that this voluble powerbroker reveled in sharing stories about
his access and influence. 340 Ultimately, I cannot account for why
Burlingham would at separate times indicate that both the Cardozo
and Hand offers came in 1909, but then not connect the dots between the two. He must have had his reasons, and whatever they
were, Burlingham never revealed them.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, one of three theories must explain why Hand never said anything: Hand knew about the 1909
offer to Cardozo but simply chose to remain silent; Hand never
knew and thus could not have informed anyone; or Hand never
knew, and thus could not have commented, because the offer did
not occur in 1909.341 Obviously I do not believe the third scenario
to be the case. Between the first two possibilities, I think the second
is most likely, that Hand never knew about the 1909 offer to Cardozo. I arrive at this conclusion primarily through a process of
elimination. We know that Hand was not reluctant to reveal his
own conversation with Cardozo aboutjoining the Southern District,
which probably occurred in late 1911 or early 1912. Why then
would Hand discuss one possible appointment of his good friend to
the Southern District, but not another, even if it was for his own
seat? Moreover, if Taft, Wickersham, Cardozo, and Burlingham
never told the story of the 1909 Cardozo-Hand connection to
others, there is no reason to assume they told it to Hand. And if
they did not tell him, it is unlikely that others had the knowledge to
be able to do so. Not a very satisfying theory, I admit, but hardly
339. See Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at 31 ("If this is all secret. ."),
39 ("I
have a story. I suppose that if this is going to be hidden for a good while. . "). See also
supra note 172 (indicating that Columbia assured Burlingham his interviews would not
be released at least until after his death).
340. For example, when discussing Cardozo's unlikely appointment to the New
York Court of Appeals after less than two months as a state Supreme Court Justice,
Burlingham says, "We got to be good friends. Then he went to Washington. I don't
think he wanted to go. He was very happy in the Court of Appeals. Pound was the
senior but he yielded. I must tell you about that." Burlingham COHP, supra note 39, at
11. Once he tells of how Cardozo got to the Court of Appeals, Burlingham is again off
and running about Cardozo's time on that bench: "He was wonderful. Everybody in the
Court adored him. I'll tell you a story which I got from Irving Lehman who was with
him there and who became Chief Judge . . . ." Id. at 12.
341.

See supra text accompanying note 154.
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any more inexplicable than the silence of all of the other persons
involved in the events of 1909.
V.

CONCLUSION

The HarvardLaw Review in 1947 dedicated an issue to the occasion of Judge Learned Hand's seventy-fifth birthday.3 42 Authoring
the lead tribute, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote:
In sponsoring Learned Hand's appointment to the District Court, Attorney General Wickersham showed a keen
scent for intellectual powers and a realization of their
need particularly on the federal bench. Learned Hand
would hardly have appeared as an inevitable choice had
there been deference to the usual considerations guiding
the selection of federal judges. While the discerning were
at once excited by Mr. Wickersham's bold recommendation of Hand to President Taft, it took the pedestrian
members of the profession some time to make their ad3 43
justment to the new planet in the judicial sky.
Compare Frankfurter's laudatory description of Hand as an unconventional pick with the following insight by Kaufman of Cardozo's
alleged near-appointment to what would have been the same seat
by the same persons at the same time:
It is true that an offer of a federal judgeship to a politically connected lawyer would not necessarily demonstrate
the lawyer's professional achievement, but Cardozo had
taken no part in political life. He came to the attention of
men like Wickersham and Burlingham solely through his
3 44
professional accomplishments.
In either of these anecdotes, Cardozo's name could be substituted
for Hand, and vice versa, and the passages would appear no less
accurate. Indeed, in 1909, Cardozo and Hand were seemingly
more alike than different, with one notable exception: according to

Kaufman, "Cardozo's reputation as a lawyer greatly surpassed that
of Hand.
342.
343.
344.
345.
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I believe it makes perfect sense that Wickersham, him-

See 60 HARv. L. REv. 325 (1947).
Frankfurter, supra note 1, at 326.
KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 101.
Letter from Kaufman to Hessler, supra note 13.
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self a successful attorney, would have Burlingham approach the
more prominent Cardozo first for the newly created Southern District judgeship. Once Cardozo declined, Burlingham in turn recommended to Wickersham that Hand represented the next best
choice of a young, intellectual practitioner. Both Cardozo and
Hand were well-qualified candidates, and the selection of either
would fulfill the Taft administration's commitment to an independent, meritocratic judiciary.
In late 1911, when a vacancy next arose on the Southern District, the political climate would be vastly different, and the incentives arrayed before Taft had shifted considerably. Gunther aptly
captures the dynamics of this transition:
Fortunately for Hand, [in 1909] quality appointments
were a high priority of the new administration. This nonpartisan zeal is surprising in light of Taft's later reputation. By 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt bolted the
Republicans to form his Progressive Party, Taft was cast as
a conservative party loyalist warding off the assaults of a
reform-minded insurgent, but at the outset of his term,
he was eager to establish his independence and was, indeed, more ready to defy the party organization than
Roosevelt had been.3 46
It is implausible that in 1912, Taft would look to first appoint Cardozo, a nominal Democrat, before turning to Mayer, a partisan Republican. Both men undoubtedly were fine candidates for the
federal bench, but selecting Mayer risked far less political capital at
a time when such currency was in desperately short supply.
The following year, 1913, Burlingham returned to Cardozo
with an offer to join the Fusion ticket as a candidate for the New
York Supreme Court. This time Cardozo accepted, and upon his
election that fall, he joined Hand among the ranks of the judiciary.
Less than two decades later, Cardozo would be appointed to the
U.S. Supreme Court and Hand would be in the early stages of his
extraordinary tenure on the Second Circuit. And eighty years after
that, with the publication of the definitive biographies of both men,
we have a far greater, but still incomplete understanding of the beginning of Cardozo and Hand's illustrious judicial careers. Unfor346.
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supra note 5, at 129.
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tunately we may never know with absolute certainty the full story of
Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, and the Southern District of
New York. On the basis of the evidence available nearly a century
later, however, I believe that Hand's appointment in 1909 came
only after Cardozo first spurned the opportunity, leaving us to speculate how legal history may have differed had these two legendary
jurists not ascended to their respective benches when and where
3
they did.
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See Friedman, supra note 15, at 1747 n.41 (speculating).

